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I. INTRODUCTION
At least since the 1940s, the courts have struggled to determine the
proper judicial role in reviewing statutory interpretations made by ad-
ministrative agencies. This struggle has been thought to reflect the
tension between the judiciary's recognized duty "to say what the law
is,"I and the reality that many considerations, including agency exper-
tise and explicit or implicit congressional delegation, suggest that
agency statutory interpretations should be given great weight even if
contrary to judicial inclinations.2
For forty years, two lines of authority reflected that tension. The
first, represented by NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc.,3 generally
took into account various factors such as agency expertise, consistency
and duration of the agency position, and the need to reconcile conflict-
ing congressional policies in determining whether to grant deference
to agency statutory interpretations. Where this multifactor approach
supported granting deference, the courts purported to accept agency
interpretations as long as they were reasonable. Under the second
line of authority, represented by Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB,4 the
courts considered questions of statutory interpretation to be "naked
question[s] of law"5 to be decided by the courts without regard to the
agency's position.
With the Supreme Court's 1984 decision in Chevron U.S.A. v. Natu-
ral Resources Defense Council,6 it seemed that much of the tension
might have been resolved. Here was a unanimous decision 7 setting out
a relatively simple, perhaps even straightforward, approach to the
question of when and how much deference should be given to agency
interpretations of statutes within their purview. The uncertainty of
determining which line of authority to follow and the complexity of
the multifactor approach had apparently been replaced with a two-
step analysis. First, has Congress spoken to the point at issue? If it
has, congressional intent governs. Second, if the statute is silent or
1. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
2. See Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 283 (1986)
(citing Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 CoLum. L. REV. 1, 5
(1983)).
3. 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
4. 330 U.S. 485 (1947).
5. Id. at 493.
6. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
7. While Chevron was unanimous, Justices Marshall, O'Connor, and Rehnquist did
not participate in the decision. Shortly after Chevron, all three of these Justices
joined or wrote opinions adopting the Chevron approach to deference. See, e.g.,
Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 470 U.S. 116, 117,
125, 134, 152 (1985) (Rehnquist joining the majority opinion upholding the agency
under Chevron; O'Connor joining Marshall's dissenting opinion affirming Chev-
ron as a proper approach to deference analysis).
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ambiguous, the agency's construction should be accepted if it is
reasonable.8
Commentators favoring heightened deference to agency interpre-
tations hailed Chevron as having resolved previously conflicting
Supreme Court precedents 9 and having "transformed dramatically the
approach taken by courts in reviewing agency interpretations of statu-
tory provisions."10 They urged a "strong" reading1" of Chevron that
would, they argued, appropriately limit the judicial role in making pol-
icy decisions, thereby affirming the fundamental allocation of author-
ity and responsibility among the branches of government.12 Other
observers found Chevron to be more troubling, undermining the prin-
ciple that agencies must be held to comply with the law,'8 adopting an
unrealistically simplistic approach to a complex problem,14 and creat-
ing an anomalous doctrine that would make the law of deference even
more unstable than it had been before Chevron.15
Conclusions that Chevron has established a new definitive and
highly deferential approach to judicial review of agency interpreta-
tions are, at best, premature. The Court's decisions following Chevron
reveal a steady erosion of the apparent consensus favoring heightened
deference.16 By 1987, only three years after Chevron, the Court was
evenly split in its reading of the case, with Justice Scalia leading a
spirited defense of the "strong" position against an unstated but clear
move back to pre-Chevron approaches to deference.17 Since Justice
8. Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 n.9 (1984).
See Starr, supra note 2, at 287-88, describing the Court's decision and characteriz-
ing its approach as "a simple two-step framework." This reading of Chevron has
come to be known as "the Chevron two-step." See Pierce, Chevron and its After-
math. Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations of Statutory Provisions, 41
VAND. L. REV. 301, 301 (1988); Starr, Sunstein, Willard, Morrison & Levin, Judi-
cial Review of Administrative Action in a Conservative Era, 39 ADMIN. L. REV.
353, 360 (1987) [hereinafter Judicial Review Debate].
9. Starr, supra note 2, at 294.
10. Pierce, supra note 8, at 302.
11. The term "strong" reading of Chevron was coined by Professor Cass Sunstein.
Judicial Review Debate, supra note 8, at 367. It has become a virtual term of art
referring to an application of Chevron that maximizes deference to agency inter-
pretations and minimizes judicial opportunities to determine statutory meaning
from any source other than the language of the statute itself. Although he coined
the term, Professor Sunstein is not an exponent of this approach to Chevron. See
Sunstein, Factions, Self-Interest, and the APA- Four Lessons Since 1946,72 VA. L.
REV. 271, 290-91 (1986).
12. See, e.g., Starr, supra note 2, at 294-96, 309.
13. Mikva, How Should the Courts Treat Administrative Agencies?, 36 AM. U.L. REV.
1, 7 (1986).
14. Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363,
373 (1986).
15. Id. at 397-98. See also Sunstein, supra note 11, at 291.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 283-357.
17. See Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452-55
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Kennedy took his seat on February 18, 1988, he has authored one opin-
ion indicating that he favors the "strong" reading,1S but his particular
approach seems to be acceptable to only one of the other Justices.9
Thus, the Court's approach to deference in the next few terms is
likely to be highly unstable. Even assuming that Justice Kennedy will
adhere to the "strong" reading of Chevron, there will be only a one-
vote margin one way or the other. The debate is such that a third, or
even a fourth, approach might command a few votes from either
camp.20
What has happened to the apparent Chevron consensus? This Ar-
ticle seeks to answer that question. First, it traces the deference de-
bate from the 1940s to the Chevron decision. Second, it examines the
Chevron decision itself, the post-Chevron commentary, and the
Supreme Court's treatment of deference since Chevron.
This review supports the following conclusions. First, the seminal
decisions, which dominated deference doctrine for forty years, do not
support a strong, highly deferential application of Chevron. To the
contrary, the granting of deference prior to Chevron consistently de-
pended upon the practical, common-sense considerations2l reflected in
multifactor analysis.22 Second, the four decades before Chevron saw a
shift in which political conservatives turned from Opposing to embrac-
ing heightened deference, while political liberals similarly reversed
their positions from support to skepticism of deference. 23 Third, Chev-
ron itself is entirely consistent with previous deference doctrine. It
does not support the "strong" reading urged by some commentators.24
Fourth, the multifactor or sliding scale analysis, which derives directly
from the practical reasons for deferring to'agency interpretations, re-
mains important to deference doctrine in the Sup;reme Court.25 Fifth,
the current split on the Supreme Court over deference doctrine re-
flects an ideological division between liberals and conservatives, with
(1987) (Scalia, J., concurring); NLRB v. United Food and Commercial Workers
Union, Local 23, 108 S. Ct. 413, 426-27 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring, joined by
Rehnquist, White, and O'Connor). Since the latter decision was reached by an
eight-member Court, after the resignation of Justice Powell and before Justice
Kennedy took the bench, the Court was split 4-4 on the interpretation of
Chevron.
18. K-Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 1811 (1988). See also infra text accompa-
nying notes 354-56.
19. Justice White concurred in Justice Kennedy's opinion in K-Mart and took a simi-
lar position in a concurring opinion in Regents of the Univ. of Calif. v. Public
Employment Relations Bd., 108 S. Ct. 1404, 1413 (1988).
20. See infra text accompanying notes 230-33.
21. Starr, supra note 2, at 297.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 84-125, 128-31.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 132-42.
24. See infra text accompanying notes 186-98.
25. See infra text accompanying notes 234-60.
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liberals adhering to traditional deference analysis, while conservatives
seek to impose strict limitations on judicial review of agency interpre-
tations. The conservative effort, if successful, could have dramatic im-
plications for the future of the administrative state.26
II. DEFERENCE PRINCIPLES BEFORE CHEVRON
While the debate over judicial review of agency interpretations of
statutes can be traced at least as far back as the 1880s,27 the modern
era of the deference debate began in the 1940s in the wake of the
agency expansion and regulatory explosion of the New Deal. In 1944,
Dean Pound wrote of "a growing administrative absolutism which...
has... become a serious problem. '28 To him, the central question was
how to assure agency compliance with the law and protection of indi-
vidual rights "without detracting from the efficiency of the adminis-
trative agencies in their legitimate operations in their legitimate
field."29
A lifelong Republican and political conservative, Dean Pound
branded advocates of the administrative state as Marxists and served
as a leading polemicist in the unsuccessful conservative resistance to
the New Deal.30 He complained that agencies tend to "weight proce-
dure heavily in favor of the government," to ignore private interests in
their zeal to achieve their missions, 31 to hamper presentation of cases
adverse to the agency positions, and to attempt to avoid judicial scru-
tiny of agency orders.32 Of particular significance to the current de-
bate, he argued that restrictions upon judicial review were especially
serious in light of the "tendency of administrative agencies to act on
policies of their own devising rather than on those prescribed in the
statutes, and to direct application of the statutory policies toward ulti-
mate ideas beyond those of Congress or of the legislature."33
These concerns remain central to the deference debate. Perhaps
the most striking aspect of the current debate, however, is that these
concerns are now expressed by political liberals such as Judge Abner
Mikva, while political conservatives such as Judge Kenneth Starr
have warmly embraced and sought to enhance deference to agency
statutory interpretations. 34
26. See infra text accompanying notes 352-57.
27. Pound, Administrative Law and the Courts, 24 B.U.L. REV. 201, 202 (1944).
28. Id. at 204.
29. Id. at 202.
30. D. WIGDOR, ROSCOE POUND 271-72 (1974); Gellhorn, The Adminstrative Proce-
dure Act The Beginnings, 72 VA. L. REV. 219, 221-24 (1986).
31. Pound, supra note 27, at 208.
32. Id. at 215, 217.
33. Id. at 219.
34. Contrast Mikva, supra note 13, with Starr, supra note 2.
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A. The Foundations of the Deference Debate
Before Chevron, NLRB v. Hearst Publications Inc.3 5 and Packard
Motor Car Co. v. NLRB 36 were commonly considered to be the leading
cases on the issue of deference to agency statutory interpretations.3 7
Hearst has generally been held to be the leading case recognizing and
granting deference to agency interpretations, 38 while Packard is fre-
quently cited as representing the proposition that courts should inde-
pendently determine questions of law.3 9
Two other decisions are also frequently placed in this pantheon.
Gray v. Powell,4o which was relied upon in Hearst in support of a def-
erential approach, was initially considered the leading case in the
area.41 While its significance is still recognized, it has since been over-
shadowed by Hearst.42 Skidmore v. Swift & Co.43 differs from the
others in that it does not involve direct judicial review of an agency
decision. Rather, in settling a private dispute, the Court gave substan-
tial weight to the views of an agency that frequently addressed similar
issues in carrying out its responsibilities. In doing so, the Court dis-
cussed the considerations that supported deference in that case, con-
siderations that have continued to play an important role in decisions
about whether or not to defer to agency interpretations.
Of these authorities, Gray, Hearst, and Skidmore may be said to
support deference to agency interpretations, or at least to establish the
circumstances in which deference is appropriate. Packard, on the
other hand, represents the proposition that issues of law are for the
courts to decide.
1. The Deferential Position-How Much Real Deference?
Gray involved the question of whether the Seaboard Air Line Rail-
way Company was a "producer" of coal under the Bituminous Coal
35. 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
36. 330 U.S. 485 (1947).
37. See, ag., L. JAFTa, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 558-64 (1965);
Coffman, Judicial Review of Administrative Interpretations of Statutes, 6 W.
NEW ENG. L. REV. 1, 3 n.11 (1983); Note, Perfecting the Partnership: Structuring
the Judical Control of Administrative Determinations of Questions of Law, 31
VAND. L. REv. 91, 114 (1978)(citing Hearst and Packard as "[t]he classical exam-
ples of the varied judicial responses to agency determinations of law").
38. See, eg., Breyer, supra note 14, at 366-67.
39. See, eg., id.; Coffman, supra note 37, at 3 n.11.
40. 314 U.S. 402 (1941).
41. See, e.g., Davis, Scope of Review of Federal Administrative Action, 50 COLUm. L.
REv. 559, 571 (1950).
42. See, ag., Coffman, supra note 37; Stever, Deference to Administrative Agencies in
Federal Environmenta Health and Safety Litigation-Thoughts on Varying Ju-
dicial Application oftheRule, 6 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 35,36-37 (1983); Note, The
Administrative Interpretation of Statutes, 39 GEO. L.J. 244, 247 (1951).
43. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
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Act of 1937.44 Seaboard, which burned large amounts of coal in its
railroad operations, had leased certain coal lands. It had then ar-
ranged for an independent contractor to lease the coal mining equip-
ment on the leased property, and provided ultimately for delivery of
the coal mined on the leased property to Seaboard at a fixed price,
with all risks of operation to be borne by the contractor.4 5 If, under
this arrangement, Seaboard qualified as a "producer" of coal under the
Bituminous Coal Act, it would have been exempt from certain excise
taxes otherwise imposed by the Act.46 The excise taxes were part of a
legislative scheme designed to stabilize coal prices and ease the eco-
nomic difficulties of the soft coal industry.47
In enacting the Bituminous Coal Act of 1937, Congress had not de-
fined what coal it considered to be exempt.48 Instead, Congress had
left it to the Bituminous Coal Commission to determine whether any
particular coal was exempt from the provisions of the Act.49 Seaboard
had applied to the Commission for an exemption on the ground that it
was a "producer" of coal. The Commission had denied the exemption.
The issue, as couched by the Court, was "whether the Director's
finding that Seaboard is not the producer of this coal is to be sus-
tained."5 0 This very framing of the issue suggests that the Court was
taking a deferential approach to review of the agency's decision. Had
the Court viewed the question solely as a matter of law for the Court
to decide, the issue would presumably have been framed as whether
Seaboard fell within the scope of the term "producer" under the Bitu-
minous Coal Act. From the beginning, the Court's focus was not on
what the Act meant, but on whether to sustain the agency's decision.
The Court's later discussion confirmed that it was taking a deferential
approach.51
The important question is why the Court determined that such def-
erence was not only appropriate, but required. The answer in Gray is
44. Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402, 403 (1941).
45. Id. at 407-09.
46. Id. at 403 & n.1.
47. Id. at 410.
48. Indeed, while the Senate would have adopted such a definition, the conference
report had eliminated it from the legislation. Id. at 410-11.
49. Id. at 411 & n.1.
50. Id. at 411.
51. The Court stated, for example, that in this case,
the function of review placed upon the courts by § 6(b) is fully per-
formed when they determine that there has been a fair hearing, with
notice and an opportunity to present the circumstances and arguments
to the decisive body, and an application of the statute in a just and rea-
soned manner.
Id. (emphasis added). The fact that there is "no dispute as to the evidentiary facts
... does not permit a court to substitute its judgment for that of the Director." Id.
at 412.
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relatively straightforward. First, the Court found that the statutory
provision authorizing the Commission to determine applications for
exemptions from the Act constituted a specific delegation to the Com-
mission to determine who qualified as a "producer." 52 Second, since
Congress had delegated this determination to the agency, it was a mat-
ter of "the usual administrative routine."53 Third, Congress had made
the delegation because the agency had "experience in [the] particular
field." That experience "gave promise of a better informed, more eq-
uitable, adjustment of the conflicting interests of price stabilization
upon the one hand and producer consumption upon the other."54
Thus, deference in Gray hinges on (1) the fact that Congress had spe-
cifically delegated the question to the agency, (2) the nature of the
question as one of "administrative routine," particularly in light of the
delegation, (3) the agency's expertise in the field, and (4) the need to
resolve conflicting interests at a level of detail not addressed by
Congress.
In Hearst, the Court reviewed a decision of the National Labor Re-
lations Board that certain "newsboys" constituted "employees" of var-
ious newspapers and thus fell within the jurisdiction of the National
Labor Relations Act.55 The newspapers argued that the newsboys
were independent contractors under common-law standards gov-
erning employment, and that common-law standards "determine the
'employee' relationship under the Act."56
By contrast to Gray, the Hearst Court characterized the issue as
52. Id. at 411, 412.
53. Id. at 411.
54. Id. at 412. Elaborating on these points, the Court later said.
Between the two extremes [where a company clearly is or is not a pro-
ducer] are the innumerable variations that bring the arrangements
closer to one pole or the other of the range between exemption and in-
clusion. To determine upon which side of the median line the particular
instance falls calls for the expert, experienced judgment of those famil-
iar with the industry. Unless we can say that a set of circumstances
deemed by the Commission to bring them within the concept "producer"
is so unrelated to the tasks entrusted by Congress to the Commission as
in effect to deny a sensible exercise of judgment, it is the Court's duty to
leave the Commission's judgment undisturbed.
Id. at 413. It is worth noting that just prior to making this statement, the Court
itself determined when a buyer clearly does not qualify as a producer and when it
clearly does. Thus, the Court kept to itself the determination of the boundaries
of the agency's authority, leaving the agency to resolve matters within those
boundaries.
55. NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944). As the Court explained,
the term "newsboys" was a misnomer, suggesting youth and inviting comparison
with temporary or casual distributors of newspapers. These were "generally ma-
ture men" who had worked on a regular basis, often for many years, and who
were subject to supervision and various requirements imposed by the newspa-
pers. Id. at 116-19.
56. Id. at 120.
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"whether the newsboys are 'employees,' "57 rather than whether the
Board's determination of that issue should be sustained. While the
Court later took a deferential approach similar to Gray, this charac-
terization of the issue might have been a signal that the Court would
independently determine the fundamental issues of statutory con-
struction that guide whatever decisions may be left to the agency.
The Hearst Court proceeded to do just that. First, the Court re-
jected the argument that the scope of the term "employee" was to be
determined by reference to common-law standards.58 Second, the
Court held that the scope of the term was to be determined in light of
the purposes of the Act and the "mischief at which the Act [was]
aimed." 59 Only after independently establishing these parameters did
the Court even consider what the Board had held in the particular
cases, much less give any deference to the Board's decision.
Given the Court's holding that the term "employee" was to be de-
fined and applied in light of the purposes of the Act, the question for
the Court became whether "the Board's determination that specified
persons are 'employees' under this Act... has 'warrant in the record'
and a reasonable basis in law."60 As in Gray, there is no doubt that the
Court was now taking a deferential approach. The question, again, is
why it did so.
The answer, while not as clear here, is essentially the same as it
was in Gray. First, although it could not point to a specific statutory
provision, the Court again found that Congress had delegated this de-
cision to the agency.6 ' Second, the Court held that the determination
of whether particular relationships constitute employment under the
Act requires familiarity with various employment relationships and
the experience to judge whether the use of collective bargaining for
particular relationships would serve the purposes of the Act.62 Third,
57. Id.
58. Id. at 123-29. The Court based this decision upon a determination that Congress
had "intended to solve a national problem on a national scale," which would not
be possible if the definition of "employee" were governed by various and conflict-
ing state common-law approaches, and that the application of common-law tests
would not be conducive to achieving the purposes of the Wagner Act. Id. at 123,
125-26.
59. Id. at 126. The Court held that "the broad language of the Act's definitions...
leaves no doubt that its applicability is to be determined broadly, in doubtful situ-
ations, by underlying economic facts rather than technically and exclusively by
previously established legal classifications." Id. at 129.
60. Id. at 131.
61. "Th[e] task of definitively determining the scope of 'employee' has been assigned
primarily to the agency created by Congress to administer the Act." Id. at 130.
62. This knowledge and experience "must be brought.., to bear on the question who
is an employee under the Act." Id. Once again, the Court independently deter-
mined the requirements of the statute before deferring to the agency's applica-
tion of the statute to the particular case.
[Vol. 68:454
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as a result of the delegation and the need for expertise, the Court
viewed such decisions as part of the Board's "usual administrative rou-
tine."63 Finally, summarizing its approach, the Court stated that the
courts should take a deferential approach "where the question is one
of specific application of a broad statutory term in a proceeding in
which the agency administering the statute must determine it
initially."64
As in Gray, the Court's deference in Hearst was justified by (1) the
delegation of the issue to the agency, (2) the nature of the question as
one of "administrative routine," and (3) the agency's expertise in the
field. While the Hearst Court did not specifically rely upon the need to
resolve conflicting interests at a level of detail not addressed by Con-
gress, its reference to the need for "[e]veryday experience" to deter-
mine when a relationship should be considered to constitute
employment under the Act65 implicitly recognizes that basis for defer-
ence. In addition, that reference may explain in part the Court's will-
ingness to find a delegation to the agency to decide the question. After
all, if that type of experience is necessary to apply the Act, Congress
must have intended the agency to have primary responsibility for de-
termining who qualifies as an "employee."
The third foundational decision representing the deferential line of
authority is Skidmore v. Swift & Co.66 Skidmore is distinct from other
decisions discussed here in that it did not involve judicial review of an
agency decision. Rather, it was a private action brought by fire fight-
ing employees to obtain overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards
Act (FLSA).67 While Congress had created the office of Administra-
tor under the FLSA, it had not authorized the Administrator to make
determinations in particular cases. Instead, it had required and em-
powered the Administrator to become familiar with employment con-
ditions in industry and to bring injunctive actions as need be to
restrain violations. Thus, unlike Gray and Hearst, there was no dele-
gation to the agency to apply the Act to particular situations.
Nonetheless, the Court found it appropriate to grant some defer-
ence to the Administrator's views as expressed in an interpretative
bulletin, in informal rulings, and in an amicus brief that the Adminis-
trator had filed in the private action. While noting that the Adminis-
trator's statements are neither conclusive nor binding on a district
court in the same manner as a higher court ruling, the Court empha-
63. Id.
64. Id. at 131.
65. Id. at 130.
66. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
67. The employees argued that the time that they spent on call on the company
premises or within hailing distance constituted work time under the Act. Id. at
135-36.
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sized that the Administrator's pronouncements should be considered
and perhaps even given great weight in particular cases. The general
respect due the Administrator's statements arises from the fact that
they are made in pursuit of official duties and that they are based upon
expertise not available to the courts.68 The weight to be given the Ad-
ministrator's judgment, however, may vary depending upon "the thor-
oughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its
consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those fac-
tors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control."69
This was one of the early clear articulations of the multifactor ap-
proach to deference analysis.
Taking these three cases together, it is possible to identify several
criteria for determining whether and how much deference should be
given to agency decisions. First, if the Court determines that Congress
has delegated a decision to an agency, the Court appears likely, under
these decisions, to defer to a reasonable agency construction or appli-
cation of a statutory term that might otherwise be considered a matter
for the courts. Delegation appears to be the strongest basis for defer-
ence because it is rooted in a specific congressional intention to have
the agency make the decision. The crucial question with respect to
delegation is exactly what was delegated to the agency.
Second, while the Court will determine the boundaries of statutory
terms and the principles that govern their application to specific cases,
it will defer if an issue is one of "administrative routine." Third, and
closely related to the second criterion, the Court may defer if the
agency's expertise in the field is necessary to reach an informed deci-
sion in the particular case. Fourth, where Congress has established the
boundaries and the principles governing a dispute but has not ad-
dressed the myriad possible permutations, the Court will defer to
agency resolution of conflicting interests where both or all interests
are to some extent protected or addressed by the statute.
The second, third, and fourth bases for deference all hinge on the
proposition that a degree of practical expertise is necessary to resolve
the conflicts at issue, and that the expertise resides in the agency, not
with the courts. Even without a finding of delegation, these considera-
tions could reasonably lead a court to defer to an agency's decision
because the court views the agency as better able to achieve the goals
of the statute.
68. Id. at 139. The Court also noted that the Administrator's statements determine
the agency's enforcement policy, and that good principles of administration re-
quire that standards governing enforcement closely parallel those governing the
determination of private rights. Id. at 139-40.
69. Id. at 140. Ultimately, the Court remanded the case for further consideration in
light of its own ruling that waiting time could, in some circumstances, be working
time, and its discussion of the role of the Administrator. Id.
[Vol. 68:454
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Three other considerations, all of which arise in Skidmore, provide
some basis for deferring, or at least giving substantial weight to agency
decisions. These are: (1) how thoroughly the agency has examined
the issue, (2) the quality of the agency's reasoning, and (3) whether
the agency's position is consistent with its other statements. These
considerations are distinct from the previous ones in that they are not
necessarily peculiar to the agency. Any party can thoroughly examine
an issue, reach a well-reasoned conclusion, and take consistent or in-
consistent positions. These factors are simply practical considerations
"which give... [the agency] power to persuade."7o
It is important to note here that none of these three foundational
decisions grants deference to an agency position simply because the
agency was charged with implementing the statute in question. Even
in Gray, where the Court recognized an explicit delegation of the issue
to the agency, deference hinged on the need for the agency's practical
expertise to apply the statute to the particular situation and the need
to resolve conflicting interests at a level of detail not addressed by
Congress. In Gray and in Hearst, the Court deferred to the agency
only after first determining for itself the boundaries of the agency's
discretion and the congressional policies that were to guide the
agency's decision. In those cases and in Skidmore, practical considera-
tions such as agency expertise in the narrow area at issue and the thor-
oughness of the agency's consideration of the issue appear to have
been significant to the degree of deference granted by the Court.
These decisions do not support the general proposition that courts
should simply defer to agency statutory interpretations as long as they
are reasonable.
2. The Independent Position-Was Deference Rejected?
If, to paraphrase Dean Pound, Gray and Hearst are considered the
precursors of unfettered deference and administrative absolutism,
Packard 71 is taken as representing the view that questions of statu-
tory interpretation are matters of law for the courts alone to decide.72
In Packard, the Court again addressed the question of the scope of the
term "employee" under the National Labor Relations Act. This time,
however, the issue was whether foremen could be considered to be
"employees" entitled to the various protections provided by the Act.
Following normal procedures, the Board had certified a union to rep-
resent foremen at the Packard Motor Car Co. and had issued a cease-
and-desist order against the company for refusing to bargain with the
union.73 As couched by the Court, the question was "whether the or-
70. Id.
71. Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485 (1947).
72. See, e.g., Breyer, supra note 14, at 366-67; Coffman, supra note 37, at 16.
73. Packard Motor Car Co. V. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 488 (1947).
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der of the Board is authorized by the statute."74
In contrast with Hearst, the Packard Court decided this issue as a
"naked question of law."75 Although, as in Hearst, the Court upheld
the Board, it did so solely on the basis of its own reading of the statute.
First, noting that the term "employee" was defined to "include any
employee," it held that "foremen are employees both in the most tech-
nical sense at common law as well as in common acceptance of the
term."76 Second, it rejected the company's argument that foremen fell
within the statutory definition of "employer," which included "any
person acting in the interest of an employer, directly or indirectly." 77
According to the Court, the context of the Act did not allow for a con-
struction that would exclude foremen from the definition of "em-
ployee," and there was not even any "ambiguity in this Act to be
clarified by resort to legislative history."7 8
The Court's approach is striking for several reasons. First, since
the effect of the Court's decision was to uphold the Board, the Court
could have relied upon the Board's decision, and perhaps upon the
Board's reasoning. It could have given great weight to the Board's
view, as it had done in construing the same statutory term in Hearst
only three years earlier. Yet the majority opinion did not even cite the
Hearst decision. Second, the dissent relied upon Hearst for the propo-
sition that "the term 'employee' must be considered in the context of
the Act."79 Since the majority had relied heavily on the same proposi-
tion, it too could have cited Hearst on the point. More important, it
could have eliminated the force of the dissent's citation by using
Hearst to justify some degree of deference to the Board's decision.
Third, the Court rejected an argument that NLRB vacillation on the
issue undermined the Board's ruling in this case.80 Although the
Court recognized that this vacillation showed the difficulty of the
problem committed to the Board, it did not bow to the agency's effort
to resolve a difficult policy problem, nor did it suggest that the
agency's inconsistency undermined any respect that might otherwise
be due to the agency's expertise. Rather, the Court avoided any
doubts arguably raised by the Board's vacillation by resolving the issue
as a "naked question of law" for the Court to decide.81 Thus, the
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. The assertion that the Act was unambiguous is baseless. As the Court itself
noted, foremen fell squarely within the language of both the definition of "em-
ployee" and the definition of "employer." Id. It is difficult to imagine greater
ambiguity in the application of statutory language.
79. Id. at 495 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 492-93.
81. Id.
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Court appears to have said that deference is irrelevant with respect to
pure questions of law, since those are reserved to the courts. While
the Court did not explain when an issue becomes a pure question of
law, its discussion suggests that this occurs at least when the statute is
clear or unambiguous with respect to the particular issue.8 2
Packard serves as a counter to the Hearst line of cases in that the
Court resolved a seemingly difficult issue of statutory construction it-
self, without reference to the agency's position on the issue or to the
agency's reasoning. If we accept the Court's apparent explanation of
its action, it did so because the law was clear in Packard, while it pre-
sumably had not been clear in Hearst. Thus, even after Packard there
appeared to remain room for deference to an agency interpretation
where the Court found the governing statute to be ambiguous on the
point at issue.8 3
B. The Deference Debate from the Foundation to Chevron
These cases sparked a debate that continued, focused largely on
Hearst, until Chevron was decided in 1984. The question throughout
has been how to reconcile the Hearst and Packard lines of cases with
some coherent theory of deference, and more generally, what consid-
erations justify granting or denying deference to agency
interpretations.
Initially, Hearst was seen as a refreshing move away from the arti-
ficial attempt to draw distinctions between questions of fact and ques-
tions of law, and a sensible recognition that "relative expertness
whether of court or of agency should determine the proper sphere of
each."8 4 The difficulty, of course, is where to draw the line between a
question for which agency expertise is essential, and one appropriate
for decision by the court exercising its own expertise in statutory con-
struction. After all, if courts are experts "in anything, it is in the field
of statutory interpretation."8 5
Although Packard presented an opportunity to explain how this
line might be drawn,8 6 the Court gave no indication that the relative
82. See id. at 488 ("context of the Act... leaves no room for a [contrary] construc-
tion"); id. at 492 ("no ambiguity in this Act to be clarified").
83. Since the Packard Court apparently found clarity in the statutory language, it is
not possible to discern from the language of Packard whether the Court would
have considered legislative history or other traditional tools of statutory construc-
tion to have a role in determining whether or not a statute is ambiguous. As
discussed in Part 1(C) of this Article, infra, this is one of the central issues in the
wake of Chevron.
84. Recent Cases, 57 HARv. L. REV. 1112, 1114 (1944).
85. Note, supra note 42, at 254.
86. It seems obvious, for example, that a court is not likely to have much, if any, of
the knowledge or experience necessary to judge whether treating "newsboys" as
employees under the National Labor Relations Act would be consistent with, or
1989]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
expertise of the agency and the Court had anything to do with its ap-
proach to the case. The language of the decision suggests that the
Court found the statute clear on the point at issue, which presumably
left no room for the agency to contribute anything regardless of its
expertise in the area.8 7 Since that explanation is contradicted by the
considerable ambiguity of the statutory provisions construed by the
Court,88 the question remains why the Court chose to reach its own
interpretation of the statute rather than to accept the agency's
interpretation.
While some commentators have justifiably despaired of any gui-
dance from the Court,8 9 others have discerned a coherent analytical
approach to deference. Professor Davis, a persistent critic of the con-
servative Dean Pound in the earlier debates,9 0 was one of the first.9 1
Writing in 1950, he identified four considerations that appeared to gov-
ern the nature and degree of deference that should be accorded to an
agency's interpretation: (1) whether the court or the agency was bet-
ter qualified to decide the particular question,92 (2) whether and to
what extent Congress intended to delegate the issue to the agency, (3)
whether the case involved a "fundamental issue of law .... [or an]
would contribute to, achieving the goals of the Act. By contrast, the courts would
probably be aware of the status and function of foremen in general and could
reach well reasoned conclusions about whether foremen were the type of employ-
ees intended to be covered by the Act.
87. See supra text accompanying notes 71-82.
88. See supra note 78.
89. See, e.g., Coffman, supra note 37, at 3 ("[T]he Court has... given no consistent
rationale as to why it sometimes uses one approach and sometimes the other");
Gardner, Federal Courts and Agencies: An Audit of the Partnership Books, 75
COLUM. L. REv. 800, 822 (1975) ("The considerable majority of opinions ... sug-
gest no discernible reason by which the choice of close supervision or of deference
may be explained").
90. Gellhorn, supra note 30, at 223 n.12.
91. Davis, supra note 41, at 560, 570-71, 609-10. It is amusing, and perhaps somewhat
depressing, to note that nearly 40 years ago Professor Davis assumed that he
would not be writing about scope of review because "the literature on that subject
is already excessive and because the relatively neglected areas of administrative
law afford so much better opportunity for useful research." Id. at 559. Whatever
may have happened in the interim in other areas of administrative law, scope of
review has certainly not been neglected. It is an open question, however,
whether we have made useful progress since 1950 on the question of scope of
review of agency statutory interpretations.
92. This consideration may favor the agency, for example, "when highly specialized
subjects like geology or physics or engineering have been dealt with by the appro-
priate specialists," or when the question is one of the appropriate remedy in a
particular case. Id. at 611. It may favor the courts, however, when the subject is
one "about which the judges may easily educate themselves, such as unfair labor
practices or reasonableness of rates," or one on which "judges are clearly the ex-
perts-comnmon law, constitutional law, ethical questions, a priori reasoning, tra-
ditions and philosphies of law and government, the meaning of non-technical
words, and exploration and interpretation of legislative histories." Id.
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incidental or relatively unimportant issue of law," and (4) how what
Professor Davis called "inarticulate factors" bore on the particular
case.9 3 The "inarticulate factors" are matters that seem to influence
the Court, but are not specifically discussed in the opinions. They in-
clude the extent of judicial confidence in the agency's work and the
extent of judicial agreement or disagreement with the agency posi-
tion.94 Eight years later, Professor Davis added additional "inarticu-
late factors" to his list: the degree of thoroughness and impartiality in
the agency's performance, the court's interest in and view of the im-
portance of the subject matter, other demands on the court's time and.
attention, the need to bolster the agency's policy by independently
agreeing with it, the need for stability in law or policy, and the manner
of presentation by the agency.95
In addition to these basic considerations, Professor Davis identified
several others that may give weight to an agency position even when a
court has decided to substitute its judgment for the agency's. These
include the consistency of the agency's position, the length of time
the agency has held the position, whether the agency construction was
contemporaneous with enactment of the statute, and whether Con-
gress has shown an intent to approve the administrative
interpretation.9 6
93. Id. at 610-11.
94. Id. at 591-93, 611.
95. K. DAvis, AMINIsTRATIvE LAw TREATISE § 30.14 (1958).
96. Davis, supra note 41, at 594. See also Parker, Administrative Interpretations, 5
MiAmI L.Q. 533, 538-39 (1951)(identifying contemporaneous construction, long-
standing nature of the position, and presumed congressional acceptance or reen-
actment as contributing to the weight of agency interpretations). Also in 1950,
Professor Nathanson viewed the deference question largely as one of determining
the area of agency discretion established by a congressional delegation of author-
ity. He saw Gray and Hearst as cases in which the Court exercised independent
judgment with respect to a general issue of statutory interpretation. The agency
was then left to exercise discretion within the area defined by the Court's in-
dependent judgment. In language strikingly similar to that of Chevron 34 years
later, he suggested that, as a general theory of statutory interpretation, "[w]hen
language is ambiguous and legislative history fragmentary and inconclusive, an
administrative judgment based upon a reasoned examination of the problem in
light of both the particular facts and the broad statutory objectives is likely to
provide the most reliable guide to the effectuation of those objectives." Nathan-
son, Administrative Discretion in the Interpretation of Statutes, 3 VAND. L. REV.
470, 476, (1950). This principle would apply, however, only when the agency is
acting within the scope of delegated authority, which is for the court to deter-
mine. In that situation, Professor Nathanson argued, the agency's action is not
properly understood as one of statutory interpretation, but of exercise of its sub-
stantive discretion under the statute. Id. at 490-92. This is virtually a reiteration
of the Hearst Court's assertion that the NLRB's decision that newsboys constitute
"employees" was not a matter of statutory interpretation, but simply the "specific
application of a broad statutory term." NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322
U.S. 111, 131 (1944). Nonetheless, Professor Nathanson's commentary, including
some of the decisions that he discusses, (see Nathanson, supra at 476-79 (discus-
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A year later, an excellent student Note sounded several warnings
about the dangers of the deferential approach. 97 First, reliance upon
agency expertise or agency involvement in the legislative process may
be appropriate where the agency agrees with the goals and policies of
the legislation being construed, but it is not valid where the agency
opposed the legislation or disagrees with it. Thus, reliance upon
agency expertise or involvement in the legislative process ignores the
political reality that administrations may change or may be called
upon to implement legislation with which they disagree.98 Second,
agencies are motivated by political partisanship, which is inappropri-
ate in determining the meaning of statutes.99 Third, specialization
causes agencies to have a narrow vision that prevents the broad under-
standing of the law that should be taken into account in interpreting
particular statutes.1 00
In addition, the Note characterized the reason for the increased
deference to agency interpretations as "the belief that the court's in-
grained conservatism is a brake on social progress and inhibits rapid
adjustment of governmental activity in periods of crisis."101 This com-
ment has an ironic ring in the aftermath of Chevron, when conserva-
tives are arguing for even greater deference, and liberals are arguing
for increased judicial independence.10 2
A decade and a half later, Professor Jaffe rejected the proposition
that Hearst and Packard can be reconciled by characterizing the for-
mer as a specific application of the statute and the latter as a general
application or interpretation. Since Hearst itself can be characterized
as involving the "general application" of the statute, he argued, the
distinction lay in the nature of the legal issue. In Packard, according
to Professor Jaffe, whether foremen could organize under the NLRA
was a significant legal question, while in Hearst the status of newsboys
had no general significance.1 0 3
If this statement of the distinction fails to draw a bright line, Pro-
fessor Jaffe's ultimate description of the basis for the deference deci-
sion gives even less comfort to those seeking certainty in this arena:
[W]here judges are themselves convinced that a certain reading, or applica-
tion, of the statute is the correct--or the only faithful-reading or application,
sion of Unemployment Compensation Commission v. Aragon, 329 U.S. 143 (1946),
and Board of Governors v. Agnew, 329 U.S. 441 (1947))), seems to suggest a very
deferential approach, perhaps sowing the seeds that bore fruit in later arguments
for a "strong" reading of Chevron.
97. Note, supra note 42.
98. Id. at 252-53.
99. Id. at 259-60.
100. Id. at 260.
101. Id. at 255.
102. See infra text accompanying notes 206-34.
103. L. JAFFE, supra note 37, at 560-61.
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they should intervene and so declare. Where the result of their study leaves
them without a definite preference, they can and often should abstain if the
agency's preference is "reasonable."1 0 4
This does not mean that courts are to accept any reasonable interpre-
tation. Rather, no matter how "reasonable" an agency's position may
seem, the court has the responsibility to determine whether there is
any other interpretation that is "correct." Professor Jaffe argued that
a judge, if restricted to accepting reasonable positions even if he did
not believe them to be correct, might, "if sensitive or modest .... be
finally reduced to mere deference or frustration."105
Professor Jaffe also recognized the role of agency expertise, but he
did so only cautiously. He warned that what may appear to be expert
judgments are rarely based solely on technical or practical expertise,
and are often "as much determined by power drives and legal attitudes
as . . . by technical considerations."106 He argued, therefore, that
courts must carefully evaluate the true role and value of expertise in
each case.107 Here, then, as early as 1965, is an early proponent of the
administrative state, and a critic of conservative complaints about ad-
ministrative absolutism,0 raising concerns about excessive deference.
By the 1970s, the tone of the commentary had shifted to an even
greater skepticism about agency performance and objectivity. For ex-
ample, agencies were characterized by liberal commentators as "unre-
sponsive to public concerns, . . . overly deferential to business
interests,... [tjoo often... refus[ing] to allow citizens to participate in
agency proceedings, and zealously guard[ing] from public view infor-
mation vital to the economic interests of consumers or to the health
and safety of all citizens." 09 Agencies were seen as "captive" by, or at
least excessively influenced by, the interests they were supposed to
regulate.110
In large part, the response was to call for more open government"11
and recognition of the administrative agency as the forum for the reso-
lution of the competing claims of various groups, rather than the set-
104. Id. at 572 (emphasis in original).
105. Id. at 576.
106. Id. at 580.
107. Id. at 579.
108. Gellhorn, supra note 30, at 223 & n.12, 230 n.34.
109. Lazarus & Onek, The Regulators and the People, 57 VA. L. REV. 1069, 1070 (1971)
(footnotes omitted). As noted in the introductory footnote, the authors wrote on
behalf of the Center for Law and Social Policy, which was a liberal public interest
law firm and social action organization. Id. at 1069 n.1.
110. Id. at 1071; Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88
HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1684-87,1713 (1975). See also Shapiro, Utility Regulation and
the Political Process, 33 U. KAN. L. REV. 491 (1985)(describing the capture as the
result of an imbalance of influence by industrial interests, rather than simple bias
on the part of agencies).
111. Lazarus & Onek, supra note 109, at 1071, 1075.
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ting for detached policymaking in the public interest.112 This gave rise
to calls for adoption of an "interest representation" model of adminis-
trative law, under which fairness would be achieved by assuring fair
representation of all interests that might be affected by an agency's
action.1 13 Dissatisfaction with agency performance also gave rise to
the "hard look" doctrine in the area of judicial review of agency exer-
cise of substantive discretion. 14
In light of these developments, it is hardly surprising that Congress
should seriously consider efforts to strengthen the role of the courts in
relation to the administrative agencies. Purporting to overrule the al-
legedly unduly deferential approach of Hearst, the Bumpers Amend-
ment, first introduced in 1975, would have required that courts
"independently decide all questions of law."115 While the Bumpers
Amendment was never enacted, it symbolized the growing mood of
resistance to regulation and distrust of administrative agencies.
For the purpose of this discussion, two aspects of the effort to adopt
the Bumpers Amendment are particularly striking. First, the effort
focused, more than thirty years later, on the Hearst decision. While
the courts were developing the "hard look" doctrine in review of the
substance of agency decisions,116 and attempting to take greater con-
trol of agency procedures, 17 the principles governing judicial review
of agency statutory interpretations remained dominated by Hearst and
related decisions. Second, the amendment was generally opposed by
politically liberal organizations."1s Thus, while liberal distrust of
112. Stewart, supra note 110, at 1670, 1683.
113. Id. at 1712-13.
114. Rodgers, A Hard Look at Vermont Yankee: Environmental Law Under Close
Scrutiny, 67 GEo. L.J. 699, 704 (1979). See also Pierce & Shapiro, Political and
Judicial Review of Agency Action, 59 TEx. L. REV. 1175, 1176 (1981)(asserting
that criticism of agencies has led to increasing attempts to control them). At the
same time, one study found that it was not possible to determine "any clear and
consistent pattern, whether of close judicial supervision or of deference to the
agency's responsibilities." Gardner, supra note 89, at 820.
115. S. REP. No. 2408, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). See also 121 CONG. REc. 29,956-58
(1975) (remarks of Sen. Bumpers). For discussions of the Bumpers Amendment,
see Levin, Review of "Jurisdictional" Issues Under the Bumpers Amendment,
1983 DUKE L. J. 355; O'Reilly, Deference Makes a Difference: A Study of Impacts
of the Bumpers Judicial Review Amendment, 49 U. CIN. L. REv. 739 (1980).
116. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971), is generally
seen as the seminal decision in this development.
117. This effort was ultimately thwarted by Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v.
NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
118. Various liberal organizations, including Public Citizen, which had been founded
by Ralph Nader, opposed the Bumpers Amendment. Administrative Procedure
Act Amendments of 1976: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Administrative
Practice and Procedure of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States
Senate, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 168-69 (1976) (statement of Jacqueline Warren, At-
torney for the Environmental Defense Fund); Regulatory Procedures Act of 1981:
Hearings on H.R. 746 Before the Subcommittee on Administrative Law and Gov-
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agencies seems to have been growing during the 1970s, it had not
reached the point of rejecting deference.
In 1981, Professor Byse turned to Skidmore as the proper model
for judicial review of agency statutory interpretations. Rejecting the
concept of deference to the extent that it requires acceptance of
agency interpretations as long as they are "not irrational or unreason-
able," he argued that administrative interpretations should serve only
as "guidance" entitled to some "respect."1 9 Granting greater defer-
ence, he asserted, would relieve the court of its "ultimate responsibil-
ity for determining the meaning of the statute," and would be "an
abdication of the court's responsibility in our constitutional
system." 2 0
Two years later, Professor Stever characterized Hearst as the lead-
ing case, arguing that it should be narrowly construed as involving lit-
tle or no deference to the agency's interpretation.' 21 He found two
basic theoretical justifications for deference: (1) the fact that the
agency works with the statute every day, and (2) the fact the agency
was involved in the legislative process. 2 2 He argued, however, that
these reasons do not justify deference. Rather, since the agency was
an actor in the legislative process and thus brings a distinctive bias to
any effort to interpret the statute, courts shouldnot defer to agencies
in the interpretation of statutes.323
Professor Stever's argument brings the debate full circle. It is a
reiteration of many of the concerns expressed by Dean Pound in 1944
and in the student Note published in 1951.24 This time, however, the
argument is presented by an advocate with distinctively liberal cre-
dentials, including representing the State of New Hampshire as an in-
tervenor in the licensing proceedings for the Seabrook Nuclear Power
Plant, and service in the Department of Justice under President
Carter.'25
ernmental Relations of the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Repre-
sentatives, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 408, 436-37 (1981)(statement and testimony of
Nancy Drabble, Acting Director, Public Citizen, and Carolyn Brickey, Staff At-
torney, Public Citizen), and 536-38, 543-44 (statement and testimony of Francis
Dubrowski, Natural Resources Defense Council).
119. Byse, Scope of Judicial Review of Informal Rulemaking, 33 AumsN. L. REV. 183,
192 (1981).
120. Id.
121. Stever, supra note 42, at 37-41.
122. Id. at 60.
123. Id. at 60-62. See also Leedes, Understanding Judicial Review of Federal Agency
Action: Kafkaesque and Langdellian, 12 U. Ric. L. REv. 469, 475 (1978)(which
suggests a list of criteria for deference similar to those suggested by Davis soon
after Hearst); Note, supra note 37, at 106 (arguing that deference is appropriate
within the area of responsibility delegated to the agency by Congress).
124. See supra text accompanying notes 28-33, 97-102.
125. ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOoLs, Ti A.A.L.S. DIRECTORY OF LAW
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C. Lessons from the Pre-Chevron Era
This brief review of the foundational authority and the deference
debate prior to Chevron suggests three propositions. First, since the
beginning of the modem administrative state, there have been persis-
tent concerns about excessive deference to administrative agencies.
Second, prior to Chevron, whether to grant deference and the degree
of deference granted depended upon a variety of factors that were not
readily distilled into a simple general rule. Moreover, the courts
maintained control over fundamental questions of statutory construc-
tion. Third, criticism of, and developments in, deference doctrine
seem to have been driven largely by the political interests of the par-
ticipants in the deference debate.
As to the first proposition, the agency's perception of its mission,
undue influence from special interests, and other likely political con-
siderations, have consistently been said to create the danger that the
agency will pursue its own or its clients' interests, rather than those
protected by the statute.126 When courts defer to agencies in such sit-
uations, they fail to fulfill their constitutional role of checking arbi-
trary executive power.127
On the second point, three general considerations appear to have
dominated the deference decision. They are delegation, agency exper-
tise, and the nature or significance of the legal issue.128 Each of these
considerations provides a basis for actually shifting decisional author-
ity from the court to the agency.12 9 In addition, various essentially
practical considerations have been suggested as bases for deference.
These range from judicial perception of the quality of the agency, to
agency involvement in the legislative process, to whether the agency
has consistently held the position or has held it for a long time.13 0
TEACHERS 765 (1987-88)(biography of Professor Stever). Professor Stever con-
firmed in a telephone conversation of Oct. 25, 1988, that he considers himself a
liberal.
126. See supra text accompanying notes 28-33, 97-102, 109-10.
127. Byse, supra note 119, at 192.
128. See supra notes 69, 90-96, 103 and accompanying text.
129. Delegation is the clearest basis for shifting the decisional authority. In large part,
the court's role in reviewing agency decisions is to protect the position of Con-
gress in the separation of powers. If Congress has given the authority to the
agency, the court would be usurping, rather than protecting Congress if it refused
to defer. The only apparent limit to this proposition is the nondelegation doc-
trine. See Byse, supra note 119, at 191 (quoting Judge Leventhal on this point).
Expertise justifies shifting decisional authority on the ground that the agency is
competent to decide the issue, while the court is not. The importance criterion
would allow deference where the issue is relatively unimportant. This is less a
justification of deference than a recognition that in unimportant cases deference
will not adversely affect the fundamental structure of government, so we might
as well allow it since it may enhance agency efficiency.
130. See supra text accompanying notes 66-70.
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Although these may be reasons to "respect" the agency's interpreta-
tion, as Justice Jackson indicated in Skidmore, they do not justify ac-
tually shifting the decisional authority from the judicial branch to the
agency.
There seems to have been some consensus in the commentary that
among all these critieria, the decision whether or not to defer to the
agency depended heavily upon the importance of the legal issue.131
While this principle does not appear in the opinions, it serves to recon-
cile the apparent inconsistency of the Hearst and Packard lines of
cases. It is also consistent with both the delegation and expertise con-
siderations. The more important an issue, the less likely it is that Con-
gress delegated it to the agency for decision rather than intending the
decision to be derived by a court from the statute and legislative his-
tory. Similarly, the more important an issue as a matter of law, the
less likely it is that agency expertise in technical matters or daily im-
plementation of the statute will be crucial to understanding the stat-
ute. Finally, the proposition that the courts should decide the more
important legal issues shifts the focus from the practical benefits of
deferring to agency interpretations to the role of the courts under the
constitutional separation.of powers.
The third proposition is the most interesting. There are political
lessons to be drawn from this history. Deference and the enhance-
ment of agency authority were initially seen as benefiting interests
that favored regulation, which would today be considered the liberal
interests aligned with the Democratic party. Hearst, Gray, and Skid-
more were decided during Democratic administrations and may be
seen as part of the ultimate acceptance of the regulatory efforts of the
New Deal. Indeed, the only dissenting votes in both Gray and Hearst
were cast by Justice Roberts, a Republican who had been appointed to
the Court by President Hoover in 1930.132
Interest in the issue appears to have waned from the early 1950s
until the 1960s,13 3 when the Democrats were back in power and gov-
ernment was becoming more active. Since the Democrats controlled
both Congress and the White House from 1960 to 1968, deference dur-
ing that period tended to favor Democratic and liberal programs.
By contrast, the regulatory explosion of the 1970s, which centered
largely on efforts to regulate business to protect health, safety, and the
environment, occurred primarily during Republican administrations,
131. See supra text accompanying notes 93, 103.
132. NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944) (Roberts, J., dissenting);
Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402 (1941) (Roberts, J., dissenting); G. GUNTHER, CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW B-5 app. (11th ed. 1985).
133. Professor Davis' treatise appeared in 1958, but it relied heavily ppon the analysis
that he had done in 1950. Professor Jaffe's analysis, largely favorable to defer-
ence although recognizing its limits, appeared in 1965.
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but the regulatory statutes had been enacted by a Democratically con-
trolled Congress. 34 Essentially the same political split between the
administration and Congress has also existed since 1980.135 Thus, dur-
ing these periods, deference to agency decisions could be expected to
favor relatively conservative or Republican positions whose interests
were often inconsistent with the interests of the more liberal and
Democratic Congress. Not surprisingly, liberal interests began to be-
come more critical of agencies during this period, arguing for a
"harder look," for example,S6 and urging the courts not to defer to
agency interpretations.-3 7
When viewed in this political context, the developments in the def-
erence debate suggest that two closely related forces play central, if
not readily apparent, roles in the evolution of deference theory. First,
as Judge McGowan suggested in 1977, our system of separation of pow-
ers tends to "generate[] an ebb and flow" as relations change and ten-
sions rise and fall among the branches of government.1 38 Thus, with
Democrats in control of Congress and the White House in the 1940s
and the 1960s, there was relatively little tension among the branches
on matters of agency administration, so deference flourished as a
means of achieving congressionally determined policies. With the ex-
ecutive and the legislature in separate hands for most of the last
twenty years, however, deference has come under attack as a failure
to control executive authority.
Should the next twenty years see a continuation of this split be-
tween the political branches, these developments suggest that courts
will give less deference to the executive in order to protect the posi-
tion of the legislature in the separation of powers. This projection de-
pends, of course, upon whether the courts are concerned about
maintaining the balance among the branches, or whether they are
concerned with achieving some political agenda. If, after sixteen years
of Republican appointments to the federal courts, the dominant forces
in the judiciary are interested in pursuing the conservative political
agenda, deference is likely to increase if the executive remains in con-
servative hands.
134. See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); Clean
Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982).
135. While the Democrats controlled the White House from 1976 to 1980, this brief
period appears, with hindsight, as only a brief hiatus in two decades of conserva-
tive Republican administrations. Similarly, while the Republican party con-
trolled the Senate from 1981 to 1986, the Democrats have controlled the House
throughout the past three decades, and they have also controlled the Senate dur-
ing most of the last 20 years.
136. See Rodgers, supra note 114, at 704.
137. See, e.g., Stever, supra note 42, at 37-41.
138. McGowan, Congress, Court and Control of Delegated Power, 77 COLUM. L. REv.
1119, 1119 (1977).
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This leads to the identification of a second force driving deference
doctrine. While the first force involves the structure of government
and the relationships of the three branches, the second force is more
clearly political. In essence, if a particular political group tends to con-
trol the executive branch, members of that group will tend, eventu-
ally, to support enhanced deference, while the opposing group will
become concerned about unchecked administrative power.
The result of developments from the 1940s to Chevron was an ap-
parent reversal of liberal and conservative positions with respect to
agency authority. While conservatives initially opposed the increase
in agency power and decried the threat to individual liberties,13 9 by
the 1970s a leading conservative argued that the courts were improp-
erly interfering with agency operations.140 Liberals, who had bene-
fited from deference in the 1940s, now sought judicial mechanisms for
controlling agencies.1 4 ' After four years of judicial appointments by a
Democratic President, Professor O'Reilly wrote in 1980 that, "it is not
easy to characterize a provision that encourages judicial activism as a
long-term, conservative measure." 142 This comment seems to assume
that Democratically appointed judges will pursue liberal agendas.
This suggests, however, that while these judges may be deferential
where the executive is pursuing the generally liberal policies of a
Democratically controlled Congress, they may not defer to a Republi-
can administration's efforts to impose conservative policies on pro-
grams adopted by a Democratic Congress.
On the eve of Chevron, therefore, roles seem to have become re-
versed. Liberals, who had thrown off the yoke of a stifling judiciary
during the New Deal, were seeking greater judicial control over fed-
eral agencies, while conservatives, traditionally horrified by the pros-
pect of increased bureaucratic power, were seeking to unleash the
bureaucracy.
The shift is striking. It suggests that trends in the deference doc-
trine are more related to the politics of the time and of the judges than
they are to any pursuit of proper constitutional balance. At a mini-
mum, one must view with skepticism claims that developments in def-
erence doctrine somehow protect or threaten the constitutional
structure. While strongly and presumably honestly asserted, such
claims are at least as likely to reflect the underlying political views of
their proponents as they are to constitute an objective attempt to pur-
sue pure constitutional theory.
139. See, ag., Dean Pound's arguments, supra text accompanying notes 28-33.
140. Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, the D.C. Circuit and the Supreme Court, 1978
S. CT. REv. 345, 359-71.
141. See supra text accompanying notes 109-14, 121-25.
142. O'Reilly, supra note 115, at 790.
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III. DEFERENCE PRINCIPLES FOLLOWING CHEVRON
The Chevron decision in 1984 has been said to reconcile the con-
flicting lines of deference authority 43 and to establish a new frame-
work for deference analysis.144 According to one conservative
commentator, it serves to minimize judicial activism and interference
with agency activities,145 while a liberal commentator castigates it as a
violation of constitutional principles.146 It very rapidly became the
leading case on deference.147 It has sparked extensive and contentious
commentary,148 and has become the focus of a lively debate within the
Supreme Court on the role of the judiciary in reviewing agency inter-
pretations. The following discussion examines the decision itself, the
commentary that followed, and the Court's handling of deference
through the 1987 term.
A. The Chevron Decision
The Clean Air Act 149 is an extraordinarily complex statute. The
1977 amendments contributed to that complexity by requiring the En-
vironmental Protection Agency (EPA) to identify those areas of the
country that comply with air pollution standards and those areas that
do not.15 0 In areas that do not comply, so-called "nonattainment" ar-
eas, states must implement a permit program for all "new or modified
stationary sources" of air pollution.'5' In order to obtain a permit for
a new or modified stationary source in a nonattainment area, a com-
pany must meet various strict requirements that are intended to re-
duce existing levels of air pollution.5 2 The ultimate goal of imposing
these requirements in a nonattainment area is to bring the area into
compliance with national air pollution standards.153 If a company is
required to obtain a permit in a nonattainment area, it will be re-
quired, among other things, to implement the costly technology re-
quired to achieve the "Lowest Achievable Emission Rate" (LAER), as
143. Starr, supra note 2, at 292; Note, Coring the Seedless Grape: A Reinterpretation
of Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 87 CoLUM. L. REv. 986, 987 (1987).
144. Starr, supra note 2, at 292, 296-97; Note, A Framework for Judicial Review of an
Agency's Interpretation: Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, 1985 DUKE L.J. 469, 470 (1985).
145. Starr, supra note 2, at 307-08.
146. Mikva, supra note 13, at 3, 7.
147. Judicial Review Debate, supra note 8, at 356.
148. See, e.g., Judicial Review Debate, supra note 8; Mikva, supra note 13; Starr, supra
note 2.
149. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
150. 42 U.S.C. § 7407(d) (1982).
151. Id. § 7502(b)(6).
152. Id. § 7503.
153. Id. § 7502(a).
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defined by the EPA.154
In 1980, after several years of considering and proposing various
approaches to implementing the 1977 amendments, the EPA issued a
rule that effectively defined the term "stationary source" in nonat-
tainment areas to mean any individual smokestack, piece of equip-
ment, or other particular source of air pollution.155 Thus, a company
that wished to add a new pollution source to an existing plant, or to
modify an existing source, was required to obtain a permit and to com-
ply with the strict pollution reduction requirements of the nonattain-
ment program. In adopting this definition, the EPA rejected the so-
called "bubble concept," under which the term "stationary source"
could be read to refer to an entire industrial plant, so that nonattain-
ment permit requirements would not apply as long as there was no
increase in the amount of pollution produced by the plant as a
whole.156
In 1981, the newly elected Reagan administration revoked the ap-
proach that had been adopted by the EPA under President Carter and
authorized states to adopt the bubble concept for nonattainment ar-
eas.157 Under this application of the term "stationary source," permits
were not required for the addition or modification of individual
smokestacks or other emission sources as long as there was no in-
crease in the pollution from the hypothetical bubble that surrounded
an industrial plant. Since the company was not required to obtain a
permit, it also was not required to adopt strict pollution reduction
measures, such as LAER technology, which are designed to bring the
area into compliance with air pollution standards.158
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit struck
down the EPA's use of the bubble concept under the nonattainment
program. While it found no specific guidance in the statute or legisla-
tive history with respect to the meaning of the term "stationary
source" in this context, it reasoned that the bubble concept was "inap-
propriate" because it violated the purpose of the nonattainment pro-
gram by allowing avoidance of the program's stringent pollution
reduction requirements.159
In reversing the D.C. Circuit, the Supreme Court characterized the
issue as "whether EPA's decision.., is based on a reasonable construc-
tion of the statutory term 'stationary source.' "160 This characteriza-
tion of the issue left little doubt that the Court would take a
154. Id. § 7502(b).
155. 45 Fed. Reg. 52,697 (1980).
156. Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 857 (1984).
157. Id. at 857-59.
158. See supra text accompanying note 155.
159. Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 841 (1984).
160. Id. at 840.
1989]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
deferential approach to its review of the EPA regulation. The ques-
tion, however, is why it took this approach, and what justified defer-
ence in this particular case.
Before addressing the substance of the case, the Court described
what has come to be known as the "Chevron two-step"161 as the
proper approach for a court to take in reviewing an agency construc-
tion of a statute administered by the agency. The first step is to decide
whether the intent of Congress on "the precise question at issue" can
be clearly determined using the statute and "traditional tools of statu-
tory construction."162 If it is not possible to discern congressional in-
tent on "the precise question at issue,"' 63 the second step for the court
is to determine whether the agency's construction is permissible under
the statute, not whether it is the construction the court would have
adopted.164
After setting out these two steps, the Court went on to explain the
basis for this approach. First, where Congress has explicitly or implic-
itly left a gap in establishing a regulatory program, it may have explic-
itly or implicitly delegated authority to the agency to "elucidate a
specific provision of the statute by regulation."165 If the delegation is
explicit, the agency's regulation is controlling "unless [it is] arbitrary,
capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute." If the delegation is
implicit, the court must accept the agency's interpretation if it is
reasonable.166
Second, the court must defer to the agency where the agency's de-
cision "involved reconciling conflicting policies," and where "a full un-
derstanding of the force of the statutory policy in the given situation
... depend[s] upon more than ordinary knowledge respecting the mat-
ters subjected to agency regulation."167 In these circumstances, the
court must uphold the agency unless "it appears from the statute or its
legislative history that the accommodation is not one that Congress
would have sanctioned."168
Before undertaking its own application of these principles, the
Court criticized the D.C. Circuit as having "misconceived the nature of
its role" in reviewing these particular regulations. 16 9 Since the D.C.
Circuit had been unable to discern a congressional intent with respect
to "the applicability of the bubble concept to the permit program," it
161. Judicial Review Debate, supra note 8, at 360.
162. Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 & n.9
(1984).
163. Id. at 843.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 844.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 845 (quoting United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 382 (1961)).
169. Id.
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should not have considered whether the concept was "'inappropriate'
in the general context of a program designed to improve air quality."
Rather, the D.C. Circuit should have limited itself to the question of
whether the Administrator had acted reasonably in determining that
the bubble concept is appropriate in the context of this particular
program.170
In applying these principles, the Court reviewed the history of the
Clean Air Act and the development of the nonattainment program,
noting that the issue at hand involved only "one phrase" in a small
portion of "lengthy, detailed, technical, [and] complex" amendments
to the Clean Air Act.171 It determined that the 1977 amendments did
not refer specifically to the "bubble concept," that they did not contain
a specific definition of the term "stationary source," that the relevant
statutory terms were overlapping and imprecise, and that nothing in
the language of the statute dictated rejection of the bubble concept.172
The Court held that the statutory language appeared to reveal an in-
tent "to enlarge, rather than to confine, the scope of the Agency's
power to regulate particular sources in order to effectuate the policies
of the Act."173
The Court also found that the legislative history did not provide
specific guidance on the question of whether the bubble concept would
be permissible for the nonattainment program.174 The Court empha-
sized, however, that the legislative history revealed a congressional ef-
fort to accommodate conflicting interests in economic growth and
environmental protection.175
Turning to the case at hand, the Court determined that the EPA's
adoption of the bubble concept was clearly consistent with interests in
economic growth, and that the EPA had stated a reasonable explana-
tion for the agency's conclusion that the bubble concept also served
environmental interests.176 The Court concluded that "the Adminis-
trator's interpretation represents a reasonable accommodation of
manifestly competing interests and is entitled to deference: the regu-
latory scheme is technical and complex, the agency considered the
matter in a detailed and reasoned fashion, and the decision involves
170. Id.
171. Id. at 848-49.
172. Id. at 851, 859-61.
173. Id. at 862.
174. Id. at 851, 862.
175. Id. at 851.
176. Id. at 863. While it may not be self-evident that allowing avoidance of the strin-
gent requirements of the nonattainment program will help reduce air pollution,
the EPA relied upon studies suggesting that giving polluting facilities flexibility
in managing their operations tends to allow response to market forces, and thus
to encourage facilities to achieve pollution control more quickly and cheaply than
if they are bound by inflexible requirements. Id. at 863 & nn.36-37.
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reconciling conflicting policies."177 The Court found that while Con-
gress had intended to accommodate both economic and environmental
interests in adopting the nonattainment program, it had not done so
"on the level of specificity" at issue in the particular litigation. 78
Thus, the Administrator's interpretation was entitled to deference in
this situation.
In reaching this conclusion, the Court rejected the argument that
the EPA should not be granted deference because its interpretation of
the term "source" had varied both before and after the adoption of the
1977 amendments and for different programs under the Clean Air
Act. According to the Court, these developments demonstrated that
the definition was flexible, particularly because Congress had not indi-
cated any disapproval of the flexible approach.179 Thus, in this case,
the court of appeals had erred in adopting "a static judicial definition
of the term 'stationary source' "where Congress had not indicated any
intent to require such a definition. 8 0
Finally, the Court emphasized that, within the limits of the author-
ity delegated by Congress, an agency may implement the views of the
incumbent administration on the policy choice that Congress has left
to the agency. Indeed, it emphasized that where Congress has not re-
solved an issue, it is appropriate for the executive, as a political branch
of government, to make the choice, rather than the courts. 8 1
B. The Reaction to Chevron
Reactions to Chevron have tended to be sharply critical or strongly
supportive. Judges Breyer and Mikva and Professor Sunstein have
led the attack,-8 2 while Judge Starr and Professor Pierce have under-
taken Chevron's defense. 83 Professor Strauss has also weighed in on
behalf of Chevron, although less as an advocate for the decision than
an analyst of its place in the Supreme Court's management of the
judiciary. 8 4
Two aspects of the reaction to Chevron are particularly striking in
light of the status of deference before Chevron. First, the major com-
mentators have consistently viewed Chevron as an extremely impor-
177. Id. at 865 (footnotes omitted).
178. Id.
179. Id. at 863-64.
180. Id. at 841-42.
181. Id. at 865-66.
182. Breyer, supra note 14; Judicial Review Debate, supra note 8, at 366; Mikva, supra
note 13; Sunstein, supra note 11, at 288-92.
183. Judicial Review Debate, supra note 8, at 358; Pierce, supra note 8, at 303-04; Starr,
supra note 2, at 283-84.
184. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme
Court's Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L.
REV. 1093 (1987).
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tant decision.18 5 Second, although the deference debate is an abstract,
almost academic exercise, there is a clear correlation between appar-
ent political ideology and positions favoring or criticizing Chevron. As
to the first point, the language of Chevron, particularly when consid-
ered in light of the facts of the case, does not require or even strongly
support the proposition that Chevron was written or intended as a ma-
jor change in deference doctrine. This raises the question of why
Chevron is seen as so important, which leads to the second point, that
politics may be a driving force in the evolution of deference doctrine.
1. Does Chevron Change Deference Doctrine?
Characterizing Chevron as both "evolutionary and revolutionary,"
Judge Starr has argued that it removed the ambiguity from the Hearst
and Packard lines of cases, eliminated judicial interference with
agency actions based upon personal judicial predilections, cast doubt
upon the role of the multifactor "sliding scale" analysis that has long
had a central place in deference doctrine, and affirmed the fundamen-
tal allocation of responsibility between agencies and courts.1 8 6 Judge
Starr reads Chevron as dictating that a court's view of how a statute
should be interpreted is irrelevant as long as Congress has not explic-
itly indicated its intent on the subject, and the agency interpretation is
reasonable. 8 7 Similarly, Judge Mikva has characterized Chevron as
indicating a new willingness to defer to agencies in the interpretation
of their organic statutes, 8 8 while Judge Breyer sees a new and dis-
turbing "abdication of judicial responsibility." 8 9 When Chevron is
read in light of preceding deference authority, however, it is entirely
consistent with the Hearst line of cases. It means that the Court is to
determine the boundaries of agency discretion and the principles that
govern the agency's choice. If, in undertaking that analysis, the Court
determines that Congress had a specific intent with respect to the pre-
cise question at issue, that intent governs. However, as is usually the
case, if Congress has not spoken to the precise circumstances, the
choice is left to the agency, just as the application of the term "em-
ployee" was left to the NLRB in Hearst forty years before Chevron.
In Hearst, the Court held that "the purpose of the Act and the facts
involved in the economic relationship," rather than common-law doc-
trine, govern the agency's determination of the scope of the term "em-
ployee." 90 Similarly, in Chevron, the Court identified two important
185. See, e.g., Judicial Review Debate, supra note 8, at 356; Pierce, supra note 8, at 303;
Starr, supra note 2, at 284.
186. Starr, supra note 2, at 284, 292, 297.
187. Id. at 296.
188. Mikva, supra note 13, at 3.
189. Breyer, supra note 14, at 381.
190. NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 129-30 (1944).
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but conflicting interests (clean air and economic growth), so that the
agency's decision must be consistent with and seek to resolve those
interests in applying the statute. Just as the NLRB in Hearst could
not have based its decision on common-law principles governing em-
ployment relationships, so the EPA in Chevron could not have ignored
either of the two interests identified by the Court as the goals of the
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977.
Surely Chevron is the classic application of Hearst. While the
Court's initial statement of the first step in deference analysisL91 is
arguably broader than previous doctrine, the Court ultimately relied
upon the same familiar principles. The Court found that Congress
had implicitly delegated to the EPA the authority to formulate policy
on the question of how to define stationary sources. 192 The Court em-
phasized that Chevron concerns the application of the statute "in the
context of this particular program," not in the more general context of
a program to improve air quality.193 It also determined that the deci-
sion was governed by two conflicting congressional policies, rather
than the more general policy of achieving cleaner air on which the
D.C. Circuit had relied.194 Finally, the Court relied upon the need for
EPA's expertise to make the judgment necessary to resolve the con-
flicting congressional policies, in this instance a judgment that market
forces and company behavior are such that a bubble concept would
serve the environmental interests that Congress intended to
protect. 195
Thus, Chevron is no commission authorizing agencies to mold regu-
latory statutes to the desires of newly elected administrations. It is
little more than a reiteration of principles established years before.
Indeed, Chevron does not go as far as Hearst in that it defers to
agency action on a matter clearly within the agency's jurisdiction,
while Hearst deferred to a decision that effectively expanded the
agency's jurisdiction. Moreover, in reaching its decision in Chevron,
the Court emphasized that the case involved the application of but
"one phrase" in a technical and complex statute, that the EPA had
considered the matter in a detailed and reasoned fashion, and that
Congress had not objected to the flexible approach the EPA had taken
191. Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
192. The bases for the Court's finding of a delegation on this point were (1) the fact
that Congress had adopted conflicting policies that needed to be resolved in indi-
vidual cases, and (2) the fact that the ability to resolve those policies depended
upon expert knowledge of the field. Here, the conflicting policies were economic
growth and environmental protection. See supra text accompanying notes 166-67,
172-74.
193. Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 845 (1984).
194. See supra text accompanying notes 175-76.
195. Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 863 & nn.36-
37 (1984).
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to the issue throughout. These are the very sorts of factors that were
important to deference doctrine before Chevron. They appear to have
retained their vitality after the decision.
Despite the Court's reliance on these sorts of factors, Judge Starr
argues that Chevron has at least shed doubt upon their place in future
deference doctrine.196 He bases this proposition on the fact that the
Chevron Court rejected an argument that the EPA's view was not en-
titled to deference because the EPA had adopted this interpretation
only recently and had previously adopted varying interpretations of
the statute for different programs and at different times. According to
Judge Starr, this suggests that the Court no longer considers either
the longstanding nature of an agency interpretation nor the consis-
tency of an agency's position to be a factor in determining whether or
how much deference to give to an agency's decision.197
Judge Starr's position is illogical. In Chevron, the Court deferred
to a recently adopted agency reversal of a prior position. It does not
follow from this decision that the Court will not consider a longstand-
ing, consistent position to be worthy of deference in some other case.
Rather, in Chevron, matters such as the complexity of the statute, the
need to resolve conflicting statutory policies in the particular program,
and apparent congressional intent to delegate the matter to the agency
were sufficient to justify deference even where deference might not
have been supported by other factors.
Chevron can fairly be said to break ground in a related area, how-
ever. The Court has now made it- clear that when an agency, acting
within its delegated scope of authority, adopts a particular application
or interpretation of a statutory term, that interpretation of the term
does not constitute the meaning of the statute in any absolute sense.
Rather, it constitutes the agency's policy choice within its range of dis-
cretion. Thus, the court of appeals erred in adopting "a static judicial
definition of the term 'stationary source' "that would be binding upon
the agency in the absence of congressional action.198 A new adminis-
tration might well make a different policy choice.
While clearly stated for the first time, this proposition is not new.
It has been implicit at least since Hearst. It necessarily follows from
the logic of Hearst that the NLRB should be sustained if, after apply-
ing its expertise to the matter in light of the purposes of the statute, it
were to reach a different conclusion about the application of the term
"employee" to workers similar to newsboys.
When Chevron is judged on its own language and its own facts, it is
consistent with previous deference doctrine. While there is little
196. Starr, supra note 2, at 297-99.
197. Id. at 297.
198. Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 841-42 (1984).
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doubt that the Court took pains to emphasize the proper standard of
review of agency interpretations, it did not change that standard.
Rather, perhaps to bring the D.C. Circuit and other lower courts back
into line, it reiterated the principles that had governed deference since
the 1940s.
2. Politics and Deference in the 1980s
Since Chevron itself does not support arguments by either propo-
nents or opponents that it constitutes a dramatic departure from pre-
vious doctrine, why have commentators reacted as they have? One
possible answer is suggested by the clear ideological split among some
proponents and critics of a strong reading of Chevron. Judge Starr,
who was appointed by President Reagan, 99 and Richard K. Willard,
Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Division in the Justice De-
partment under President Reagan,20 0 have staunchly defended the de-
cision.201 Not only has Judge Starr forcefully advocated a strong
reading, but he has urged restricting the judicial role even more than
the strong reading of Chevron would require.2 02 By contrast, Judges
Breyer and Mikva, both appointed by President Carter,20 3 and Alan
Morrison, director of Public Citizen Litigation Group, a major liberal
public interest law firm,204 have criticized the strong reading of Chev-
ron and have urged adherence to more traditional, less deferential,
approaches to review of agency statutory interpretations.205 Indeed,
Alan Morrison has gone so far as to suggest that the Bumpers Amend-
ment, which he had previously oppbsed, is a necessary antidote to ex-
cessive deference.206 This position contrasts sharply with the pre-
Chevron position of Public Citizen, his major client, which had op-
posed the Bumpers Amendment in 1981.207
199. W.S. DoRNETTE & R.R. CROSS, FEDERAL JUDICIARY ALMANAC 1987 141-42 [here-
inafter ALMANAC].
200. Judicial Review Debate, supra note 8, at 371.
201. Judicial Review Debate, supra note 8, at 356-66, 372-73; Starr, supra note 2, at 284,
312.
202. Starr, supra note 2, at 308-09. Judge Starr has urged that in addition to deferring
to an agency once a statute is found to be ambiguous, the court should even re-
frain from examining legislative history in order to determine congressional in-
tent where the statutory language itself is unclear. Starr, Observations About the
Use of Legislative History, 1987 DuKE L.J. 371, 375-79.
203. ALMANAC, supra note 199, at 14, 138-39.
204. Judicial Review Debate, supra note 8, at 373.
205. Breyer, supra note 14; Judicial Review Debate, supra note 8, at 373-76; Mikva, A
Reply to Judge Starr's Observations, 1987 DuKE L.J. 380, 385-86 [hereinafter Re-
ply]; Mikva, supra note 13. This is not to suggest that all commentators are moti-
vated by political considerations. It simply reflects the positions of those
commentators whose personal politics are clearly established.
206. Judicial Review Debate, supra note 8, at 375, 393.
207. See supra note 118.
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While this hardly constitutes a statistical sample of conservative
and liberal viewpoints, it is striking in that it seems to represent a
reversal of positions from the beginning of the deference debate in the
1940s, and even since the debate on the Bumpers Amendment, which
began in 1975.208 Thus, it may be instructive to consider Chevron in its
political as well as its legal context.
The Carter administration placed great emphasis on environmen-
tal protection.20 9 Many of the environmental officials of the Carter
administration came from the ranks of liberal environmental advo-
cacy organizations. Two prominent examples were former employees
of the National Resources Defense Council (NRDC), the respondent
in Chevron. One, James Gustave Speth, who had been a founder of
NRDC and is now president of the World Resources Institute, served
as a member and as chairman of the Council on Environmental Qual-
ity.210 The other, David Hawkins, was responsible for the EPA's air
pollution programs and played a major role in the Carter administra-
tion's rejection of the bubble concept in 1980.211 Moreover, Congress
enacted the nonattainment program, with its stricter environmental
controls, under President Carter.212
In 1980, Ronald Reagan campaigned in part in opposition to strict
environmental controls. 213 He also campaigned as the conservative al-
ternative to the liberalism of the Carter years. Indeed, the 1980 elec-
tion followed what was probably the most ideological campaign since
at least 1964, when Barry Goldwater unsuccessfully sought to unseat
the liberal Lyndon Johnson.214 It is reasonable to expect, therefore,
that those who opposed President Reagan's ideology were aghast at
the prospect of the ideological shift he would bring to government pol-
icy. It is not difficult to imagine that liberal judges appointed by Presi-
dent Carter might view the actions of the Reagan administration with
considerable skepticism, even to the point of altering, consciously or
unconsciously, their approach to review of agency decisions.
The history of the Chevron case is consistent with this proposition.
After President Reagan took office, Chevron was one of the first of
208. See supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text.
209. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1979, at A24, col. 1.
210. Telephone conversation with Patty Adams, Secretary to Mr. Speth (Nov. 2,1988).
211. Telephone conversation with Mr. Hawkins, who is now back at NRDC (Nov. 16,
1988)(Mr. Hawkins also confirmed that many other environmental activists from
organizations su h as NRDC, the Audubon Society, and Sierra Club Legal De-
fense Fund joined the Carter administration.).
212. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7501-7508 (Supp. 1 1977).
213. See, e.g., Pope, The Politics ofPlunder, SmRRA, Nov.-Dec. 1988, at 49; N.Y. Times,
Oct. 22, 1980, at A30, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1980, at Al, col. 3; N.Y. Times,
Oct. 9, 1980, at A28, col. 4; N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 1980, at D14, col. 1; N.Y. Times,
July 7, 1980, at B8, col. 1; N.Y. Times, May 16, 1980, at B5, col. 1.
214. N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1980, at A19, col. 1.
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many major battles between his administration and the environmen-
tal advocacy organizations that had held so much influence under
President Carter. Moreover, since the bubble policy had been rejected
by the Carter EPA in 1980, its adoption the next year may have ap-
peared both hasty and blatantly political. In addition, Reagan admin-
istration environmental policies in general, particularly as personified
by EPA Administrator Ann Gorsuch and Secretary of the Interior
James Watt, were under sharp attack.2 15
This was the context in 1982 when three judges of the D.C. Circuit
heard NRDC's attack on the EPA's adoption of the bubble concept.2 1 6
Two of those judges, Abner Mikva and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, had
been appointed by President Carter in 1979 and 1980, respectively.2 17
Moreover, Judge Mikva had, for several years before, been a liberal
Democratic congressman. 218 It would hardly be surprising if these
judges were highly skeptical of the claims of an administration that
had practically run against the Clean Air Act. Indeed, it would be
only human to react that way to the greatest ideological shift in mod-
ern times. 219
This is not to say that the D.C. Circuit acted for blatantly political
reasons, or that any of the judges were consciously pursuing a per-
sonal political agenda.220 Rather, it suggests that there were influ-
ences on these judges that might have contributed to their willingness
215. Pope, supra note 213, at 50-51. See also N.Y. Times, Dec. 23, 1980, at A12, col. 1;
A13, col. 1; A14, col. 1.
216. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
217. Regarding Judge Mikva, see Judicial Review Debate, supra note 8, at 373. As to
Judge Ginsburg, see ALMANAC, supra note 199, at 140.
218. WHO's WHO IN AMERICAN LAW 480 (3d Ed. 1983).
219. The third member of the panel was William L. Jameson, a Senior United States
District Judge from Montana, who had been appointed in 1957 by President Ei-
senhower. While Judge Jameson was not appointed by a liberal Democratic Pres-
ident, he was appointed during a much less ideological era and might be expected
to be skeptical of the actions of an administration with such a strong ideological
agenda. ALMANAC, supra note 199, at 632.
220. Indeed, Judge Mikva has asserted that in deciding the case overruled in Chevron,
he simply acted on the principle that "[i]f the statute is silent about something,
then the agency's power should be limited." Mikva, Reply, supra note 205, at 383.
This reflects the basic principle that an agency may do no more than it is author-
ized to do by Congress, a proposition that is fundamental to the concept of separa-
tion of powers. There is little reason to doubt that Judge Mikva and other
participants in the deference debate, particularly the judges making individual
decisions, intend to and believe they act on neutral principles. This does not mean
that politics has no influence, but that it has a long-term or pervasive influence.
Judge Mikva has also asserted: "My own feeling is that judicial restraint starts
with the proposition that a judge is not supposed to be making policy decisions."
Id. at 385. While this may seem the ideal role of the judiciary, it ignores the
inevitable influences of political experience and judgment on anyone's ability to
make neutral decisions. It is a policy decision to hold that general congressional
guidance requires or prohibits a particular action by the agency, just as it is a
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to protect what they viewed as the policies of the Clean Air Act
against what they knew to be an effort to weaken environmental con-
trols. Thus, consistent with the "hard look" doctrine applicable to re-
view of agency substantive decisions, 221 but inconsistent with Hearst,
they examined the purposes of the Clean Air Act and the nonattain-
ment program in detail and reached their own conclusion concerning
the application of the term "stationary source" to the bubble concept,
even where they found no specific congressional intent on the point.222
If these judges might in some way have been influenced by their
own politics or by the political tenor of the time, they were not alone.
Judge Starr, the most prominent advocate of the strong reading of
Chevron, clerked for Chief Justice Burger and later served as Coun-
selor to the Attorney General under the Reagan administration. He
was appointed by President Reagan in 1983.223 Similarly, Mr. Willard,
who joined Judge Starr in the debate, served as Assistant Attorney
General for the Civil Division in the Reagan administration Depart-
ment of Justice.224 These men, and other conservatives, might well
also be influenced by political considerations, consciously or subcon-
sciously, in embracing heightened deference to agency decisions.
First, they were or had been members of the Reagan administration
itself, so they could be expected to support administration policies.
Second, by contrast with Justice Roberts when he dissented in
Hearst,225 these political conservatives view deference through a lens
of almost two decades of Republican political control in the White
House. Third, by the 1980s conservatives viewed what they considered
to be "judicial activism" as a major threat to conservative political po-
sitions.226 Thus, while conservatives might still be wary of govern-
ment control, it is not surprising that they would now be willing to
give greater authority to agencies, over which they seem to be able to
policy decision to hold that courts should defer to agency statutory
interpretations.
221. See, e.g., Rodgers, sup'ra note 114.
222. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718, 723, 726 n.39 (D.C.
Cir. 1982).
223. ALMANAC, supra note 199, at 141-42. He has since been appointed Solicitor Gen-
eral by President Bush.
224. See supra text accompanying notes 200-02.
225. See supra text accompanying note 132.
226. By the 1980 election, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), had become, and probably
still remains, the central symbol of judicial activism abhorrent to political con-
servatives. Other examples stretch from Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954), through Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), through the busing deci-
sions of the 1970s, to the D.C. Circuit decisions reversed in Vermont Yankee Nu-
clear Power Corp. v. National Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519 (1978) and
Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 462 U.S. 87
(1983).
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maintain political control most of the time, as opposed to courts, which
are only beginning to be dominated by conservative appointments.
Again, this is not necessarily a question of conservatives con-
sciously pursuing individual political agendas. Rather, it suggests that
attitudes toward judicial review depend in part upon the relationship
between one's political views and the political context in which one
develops attitudes toward judicial review. Thus, as Professor Sunstein
has warned, "there is only a contingent historical association between
the current deference to administrative agencies and conservatism.
And opposing deference to administrative agencies and being liberal is
a contingent position."227
Although the question of what deference doctrine should be is be-
yond the scope of this Article, these conclusions have important
ramifications for those considering that issue. Assuming that defer-
ence doctrine should assist the courts in their theoretically politically
neutral role of assuring agency compliance with congressional enact-
ments,2 28 Professor Sunstein is correct in urging that, "the institu-
tional judgment [about deference] ought to be decided .. .on some
ground other than the political one."229 The problem is that the
choice between a traditional multifactor approach and a strong read-
ing of Chevron is itself a political decision. The former arguably tends
to limit agencies, thereby favoring the political interests that do not
control the executive. The latter gives the agencies free rein, which,
in recent years, has favored conservative Republican political inter-
ests. The challenge will be how to develop and adopt deference princi-
ples that properly balance executive and judicial authority without
regard to political considerations.
For this Article, however, the next question is how deference doc-
trine has evolved in the Supreme Court since the Chevron decision.
That is the subject of the following and final section.
C. Deference in the Supreme Court After Chevron
Examination of the Supreme Court's handling of deference since
Chevron establishes that the decision did not resolve or simplify the
deference debate. Rather, as Judge Breyer predicted, it signaled a
227. Judicial Review Debate, supra note 8, at 379.
228. Some may consider this to be an incorrect description of the judicial role in re-
viewing agency decisions. Concurring and dissenting in Motor Vehicle Mfrs.
Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 59 (1983), for example,
Justice Rehnquist argued that the Court should have taken into account a change
of administrations as a reasonable basis for an agency's rejecting a position that
had been taken under a previous President. This suggests a formal role for polit-
ical considerations in judicial decisions.
229. Judicial Review Debate, supra note 8, at 379.
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new era of instability in the Court's approach to deference.230
The Court's post-Chevron decisions fall into three major categories.
The largest group includes cases in which the Court uses the language
or approach of Chevron, but in which the actual handling of deference
either fits well within traditional deference analysis, or at least does
not depend upon a strong reading of Chevron. Several of these deci-
sions rely upon the traditional multifactor analysis of the pre-Chevron
era.231 The second group, clearly the smallest, is composed of those
cases in which the Court appears to have relied upon a strong reading
of Chevron in order to defer to the agency position.232 Finally, the
third and most important group of decisions reveals a major dispute
within the Court concerning the role of the judiciary in reviewing
agency decisions. One wing of the Court is now clearly rejecting the
strong reading of Chevron, while the other would go beyond the
strong reading to restrict judicial authority still further.233
230. Breyer, supra note 14, at 397-98.
231. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Commercial Office Products Co., 108
S. Ct. 1666 (1988); Lukhard v. Reed, 481 U.S. 368 (1987); Clarke v. Securities In-
dus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388 (1987); Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478
U.S. 833 (1986); United States Dept. of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans, 477 U.S. 597
(1986); Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610 (1986); Federal Deposit Ins.
Corp. v. Philadelphia Gear Corp., 476 U.S. 426 (1986); United States v. City of
Fulton, 475 U.S. 657 (1986); United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S.
121 (1985); Cornelius v. Nutt, 472 U.S. 648 (1985); Connecticut Dep't of Income
Maintenance v. Heckler, 471 U.S. 524 (1985); Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. NRDC, 470
U.S. 116 (1985); Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood School Dist., 469 U.S. 256
(1985). See also the dissenting opinions of Justices O'Connor, Brennan, and Ste-
vens in Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors, 468 U.S. 137,161 (1984), and
of Justices O'Connor, Brennan, and Marshall in Gardebring v. Jenkins, 108 S. Ct.
1306, 1317 (1988), which rely upon traditional multifactor deference analysis.
232. Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221 (1986); Young v.
Community Nutrition Inst., 476 U.S. 974 (1986).
233. Mississippi Power & Light v. Mississipi ex rel. Moore, 108 S. Ct. 2428 (1988); K-
Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 1811 (1988); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
Public Employment Relations Bd., 108 S. Ct. 1404 (1988); NLRB v. United Food &
Commercial Workers Union, Local 23,108 S. Ct. 413 (1987); Immigration & Natu-
ralization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
In addition to the decisions discussed under these three categories, there are
four decisions in which deference is discussed, but that have little bearing on the
deference debate. In three, the Court simply denied deference on the ground
that the statute and legislative history clearly revealed a congressional intent
contrary to the position taken by the agency. Bethesda Hosp. Ass'n v. Bowen, 108
S. Ct. 1255, 1258 (1988); ETSI Pipeline Project v. Missouri, 108 S. Ct. 805, 817
(1988); Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474
U.S. 361, 367-68, 373-75 (1986). In the fourth, the Court held that deference was
inappropriate where the agency's interpretation raised serious problems under
the first amendment. In that circumstance, the Court "must independently in-
quire whether there is another interpretation.., that may fairly be ascribed" to
the statute. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr.
Trades Council, 108 S. Ct. 1392, 1398 (1988).
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1. Traditional Deference Decisions
Perhaps the most prominent of the post-Chevron decisions employ-
ing traditional deference analysis is Chemical Manufacturers Associa-
tion v. Natural Resources Defense Council, which begins with a
recitation of the Chevron approach.234 Judge Starr has cited the deci-
sion as confirming the influence of Chevron, which he views as having
strengthened the principle of judicial deference.235 In fact, however,
the Court's approach to deference is consistent with pre-hevron
analysis.
In Chemical Manufacturers, the Court upheld an EPA regulation
that provided for the granting of variances from water pollution efflu-
ent limitations otherwise applicable to a pollution source under the
Clean Water Act. Normally, the EPA promulgates effluent limita-
tions for categories of polluting facilities. All facilities that fall within
a given category must comply with the effluent limitations for that
category. Under the regulation at issue, a polluting facility could ob-
tain a variance from the limitations for its category if it could show
that the facility was fundamentally different in terms of relevant stat-
utory factors from the facilities upon which the effluent limitation had
been based.236 The issue in Chemical Manufacturers was whether the
EPA could grant such "fundamentally different factor" variances for
toxic pollutants. The Natural Resources Defense Council argued that
such variances were barred by a 1977 amendment to the Clean Water
Act that prohibited the EPA from "modify[ing] any requirement of
this section as it applies to any" toxic pollutant.237
In granting deference to the agency's position and upholding the
regulation, the Court noted the complex nature of the Clean Water
Act.238 It also identified two conflicting policies that must be consid-
ered in construing the statutory provision: on the one hand, Congress
intended uniformity among polluting sources in the same category of
polluters, but on the other hand the legislative history required the
234. Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 470 U.S. 116, 125
(1985).
235. Starr, supra note 2, at 288-91. See also Note, supra note 144, at 487, which argues
that Chemical Manufacturers eliminated any doubts that Board of Governors of
the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. 361 (1986), might have
raised about the continued vitality of Chevron. The latter argument reflects a
misunderstanding of Dimension, in which the Court simply held that the statute
in question was sufficiently clear to resolve the matter without reference to the
agency's position. See supra note 233. Thus, Dimension is merely an application
of the first step of the Chevron analysis. It in no way suggests any movement
away from Chevron, nor does it shed any light upon whether Chevron represents
a change in traditional deference doctrine.
236. Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 470 U.S. 116, 118-20
(1985).
237. Id. at 123.
238. Id. at 125.
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EPA to "take into account the diversity within each industry."239 The
Court viewed the variance as a "laudable corrective measure" whose
purpose was to account for unavoidable diversity within the same cate-
gory, while theoretically still achieving an essentially uniform degree
of pollution control within the category.240 Further, the Court em-
phasized that the dispute was essentially a question about the details
of how the EPA should implement the Act to achieve its goals, and
that the variance procedure allowed the EPA to "make] bearable the
enormous burden" of implementing this complex statute.241 Indeed,
the Court seems almost to have considered this case to involve the
type of administrative detail that is clearly left to the agency under
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC24 and similar au-
thorities with no direct bearing on deference.24 3
Thus, as in Hearst, the Court determined the binding and conflict-
ing statutory principles and simply left it to the agency to implement a
complex statute within the boundaries thus established. The Court
also found that the agency's action was not inconsistent with congres-
sional policy, and that, in any event, this was a matter that could best
be handled by the agency familiar with the difficulties and complexi-
ties of administering the program. It is not necessary to apply a strong
reading of Chevron in order to defer to the agency in this situation.
While the deference language may be broad, the facts and circum-
stances of the case support deference under traditional analysis.
Finally, it is significant that the vigorous dissent by four of the Jus-
tices did not disagree with the deference principles stated by the ma-
jority. Rather, noting that Chevron "was explicitly limited to cases in
which congressional intent cannot be discerned through the use of the
traditional techniques of statutory interpretation," the dissent argued
that the statute and legislative history clearly established that Con-
gress did not intend to allow this sort of variance.24 4 Thus, nearly half
the Court had no difficulty reaching its own interpretation even of this
complex statute. Their approach hardly suggests strong deference to
the agency when a statute is arguably ambiguous.
In United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.,245 the language
of the Court's opinion suggests a highly deferential approach, but
again the Court's actual analysis was virtually the same as it had been
in Hearst in 1944. The case involved review of a decision by the Corps
of Engineers that certain wetlands near a large lake constituted "wa-
239. Id. at 130.
240. Id. at 130.
241. Id. at 131-32.
242. 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
243. Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 470 U.S. 116, 131
(1985).
244. Id. at 152 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
245. 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
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ters of the United States" under the Clean Water Act. If they did,
they were subject to a permit program administered by the Corps to
help achieve the Act's goal of "restor[ing] and maintain[ing] the chem-
ical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters."24 6 The
status of these wetlands depended upon the answer to the question of
where "water ends and land begins."247
In describing its review of the Corps' decision, the Court appears to
have collapsed the two-step analysis of Chevron into a single question
of whether the agency's construction of the statute "is reasonable and
not in conflict with the expressed intent of Congress." 248 Perhaps the
ambiguity of the statute was so obvious that the Court simply ne-
glected to address the first step in the Chevron analysis, the determi-
nation of whether or not Congress had indicated a clear intent on the
issue at hand. Nonetheless, if taken literally, the Court's description of
deference in Riverside Bayview Homes would focus entirely upon the
reasonableness of the agency's decision, without initially seeking to
determine the intent of Congress.
While this seems a highly deferential approach, the decision itself
was actually reached under the pre-Chevron approach to deference.
As in Hearst, the Court made it clear that the determination of where
to draw the line between water and land must be based upon the pur-
poses of the statute. It then held that Congress had "intended to de-
fine the waters covered by the Act broadly," "to repudiate limits" that
had previously been placed upon federal regulation of water pollution,
and to achieve broad protection "of water quality and aquatic ecosys-
tems."249 Finally, since the Corps had determined that wetlands play
a key role in water quality, the Court deferred to the Corps' "technical
expertise" and its "ecological judgment about the relationship be-
tween waters and their adjacent wetlands" as "an adequate basis for a
legal judgment that adjacent wetlands may be defined as waters under
the Act."250 The Court then buttressed this conclusion with the obser-
vation that the issue had been raised in Congress, but that Congress
had ultimately acquiesced in the Corps' program.25 1
This analysis is entirely consistent with pre-Chevron doctrine. The
Court, not the agency, determined that the statute constituted the
source of law governing the decision. It also determined that the ap-
plication of the statute must be guided by Congress' intent to broaden
the definition of waters from previous approaches and to achieve
broad protection of water quality. Finally, it relied upon the agency's
246. Id. at 132.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 131.
249. Id. at 133.
250. Id. at 134.
251. Id. at 137.
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expert technical judgment about where to draw the line given the
legal boundaries determined by the Court. This is not simply a deci-
sion to defer to an agency's interpretation of its organic statute where
the statute is ambiguous.
Finally, Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Philadelphia Gear
Co.252 involved the question of whether a letter of credit issued by a
bank, together with a promissory note to the bank that was contingent
upon initial presentation of the letter of credit, constituted a "deposit"
insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. After the
bank became insolvent, the holder of the letter of credit presented it
to the FDIC, which did not consider the arrangement to constitute an
insured deposit and refused to make any payments on the letter of
credit.253
The Court upheld the FDIC based upon the agency's "longstanding
interpretation" that such a letter of credit did not constitute a deposit
and based upon the fact that this was not the sort of financial arrange-
ment that Congress had intended to protect when it had adopted the
insurance program.254 In developing its analysis, the Court first ex-
amined the statutory language itself, and then noted that both "letter
of credit" and "promissory note" had federal definitions, and that the
FDIC "had developed and interpreted those definitions for many
years within the framework of the complex statutory scheme." 25 5 Af-
ter holding that the agency's position was consistent with congres-
sional intent,256 the Court proceeded to a traditional multifactor
analysis. The Court noted that the FDIC had originally promulgated
its definition of "deposit" less than two months after the enactment of
the statute, and that the FDIC had consistently held this position since
that time. Moreover, Congress had never rejected the FDIC position,
and it had reenacted the statute without changing it. Indeed, Congress
had expressly incorporated the FDIC regulations into the statutory
scheme.257
Only after reciting this litany did the Court state that, "[u]nder
these circumstances, we must obviously give a great deal of deference
to the FDIC's interpretation."258 While the Court later, almost as an
afterthought, cited Chevron, it still emphasized that the FDIC was in-
terpreting a statutory definition that had been "adopted wholesale
from the FDIC's own regulation" and that the FDIC's position was
"consistent with the congressional purpose."25 9
252. 476 U.S. 426 (1986).
253. Id. at 427-29.
254. Id. at 427, 431-33.
255. Id. at 431.
256. Id. at 431-35.
257. Id. at 437-38.
258. Id. at 438.
259. Id. at 439.
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This is the most striking example of the Court's reliance upon
traditional multifactor analysis. Here, those factors include the con-
temporaneous nature of the original FDIC position, the fact that it was
both longstanding and consistent, and the fact that the case involved
the implementation of a complex statutory scheme. Moreover, the
Court itself delved deeply into the legislative history, ultimately decid-
ing that congressional intent would not be served by considering this
arrangement to constitute a "deposit." 260 Thus, not only did the
Court rely upon a multifactor analysis and identify the congressional
concerns that would govern agency choice, it ultimately held that the
outcome was the only one acceptable under the statute. This is a far
cry from simply accepting the agency's interpretation as long as it was
reasonable. Once again, the decision could have been reached under
pre-Chevron doctrine.
These decisions establish, at a minimum, that traditional deference
analysis, and particularly the multifactor approach, remain influential
after Chevron. Chevron does not seem to have made any particular
difference to the consideration or outcome of these decisions. All of
them could easily have been decided under Hearst and its progeny.
Accordingly, any deference argument at this point should clearly de-
velop all of the possible factors that had a bearing on deference prior
to Chevron, and should not be limited to using the Chevron "two-
step."
2. Strong Deference Decisions
Two of the Court's post-Chevron decisions seem to depend upon a
strong approach to deference in the sense that the Court neither cited
nor relied upon the various factors present in the cases discussed in
the previous section. As discussed below, however, both of these deci-
sions might have been reached for unarticulated reasons unrelated to
deference doctrine.
The first of these decisions, Young v. Community Nutrition Insti-
tute,26 1 involved review of a decision by the Food and Drug Adminis-
tration (FDA) not to take regulatory action with respect to certain
corn from the 1980 crop as long as the corn contained no more than
100 parts per billion of the poisonous substance aflatoxin. Two public
interest groups and a consumer challenged the FDA's refusal to act as
a violation of the following statutory provision: "[T]he Secretary shall
promulgate regulations limiting the quantity [of poisons in food] to
such extent as he finds necessary for the protection of public health."
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that by
not setting a limit for aflatoxin, the FDA had violated the statutory
260. Id. at 439-40.
261. 476 U.S. 974 (1986).
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mandate that he "shall promulgate" such limits. 26 2
Most of the Court's decision in Young is devoted to arguing that
the seemingly clear statutory language is, in fact, ambiguous, and that
the legislative history provides no further guidance.263 Having
reached those conclusions, the Court simply left the matter to the
agency, noting that "the FDA has been delegated broad discretion by
Congress in any number of areas," and that to interpret the statute as
giving the FDA the discretion to decide whether regulatory action was
necessary to protect the public health was at least "sensible."264
As one commentator has argued, Young seems to go well beyond
Chevron.265 The Young court neither relied upon traditional fac-
tors,2 66 nor identified the boundaries to the agency's discretion.267 It
left what could be a significant public health policy choice entirely to
the agency.
If the outcome of Young was determined by its approach to defer-
ence, the strong reading seems to have prevailed. Young can be ex-
plained, however, on a theory unrelated to deference to agency
interpretation. Stepping back from the narrow question of statutory
interpretation, this is essentially a case of prosecutorial discretion.
The Court has consistently been reluctant to require agencies to
devote their limited resources to particular enforcement actions. In-
deed, the Court has rendered such agency decisions unreviewable.268
Young is also much like Chemical Manufacturers269 in that the Court
is unlikely to interfere with an agency's approach to administering its
program as long as the agency seems to be seeking to achieve the goals
of the statute. While the Court did not emphasize the statutory goals
in its discussion, it was clear that the FDA had not ignored aflatoxin,
but had previously taken some regulatory action and had acted delib-
erately with respect to the 1980 corn crops at issue in the case.
If a strong reading of Chevron was important to the majority's deci-
sion in Young, Justice Stevens' dissent reveals that any such strong
262. Id. at 979.
263. Id. at 979-81.
264. Id. at 981-82.
265. Note, The Chevron Legacy: Young v. Community Nutrition Institute Com-
pounds the Confusion, 73 CORNELL L. REv. 113 (1987).
266. In its introductory discussion, the Court noted that the FDA had consistently
interpreted the statute in the same manner since 1938. Young v. Community Nu-
trition Inst., 476 U.S. 974, 977 (1986). The Court also noted that Congress had
never acted to change this interpretation, although it had addressed related as-
pects of the statute. Id. at 983. These two statements could bring Young back
within the traditional fold, but the Court seems to have placed no reliance on the
first, and used the second only to support a conclusion that the legislative history
is not unambiguous, not to support upholding the agency position.
267. See Note, supra note 265, at 131-32.
268. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
269. See supra text accompanying notes 235-44.
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reading was a misinterpretation of Chevron. Justice Stevens, the au-
thor of Chevron, dissented in Young on the ground that the intent of
Congress was clear from the language and structure of the statute, so
that there was no room for deference to the agency.270 In so doing, he
rejected the argument that the FDA's longstanding position in apply-
ing the statute justified deference to its position. He rejected reliance
upon this traditional deference factor because "the FDA had never
actually addressed in any detail the statutory authorization under
which it took" this position.27 1 Thus, Justice Stevens did not appear to
view agencies as entitled to deference as a matter of course, and cer-
tainly did not view Chevron as rendering traditional deference factors
irrelevant. The language of his dissent suggests, indeed, that he would
base deference on such common sense considerations as agency exper-
tise and thorough agency consideration of the issue over time.
The other decision that seems to apply a strong reading of Chevron
is Japan Whaling Association v. American Cetacean Society.272 The
United States is a participant in the International Convention for the
Regulation of Whaling, under which the International Whaling Com-
mission sets limits on the numbers of whales that may be harvested by
member countries. These limits are binding upon members of the
convention unless they file a timely objection to the adoption of a par-
ticular limit. A country that files a timely objection exempts itself
from the obligation to comply with the limit set for that country.273
Under a statutory provision enacted in 1971 related to international
fisheries, the Secretary of Commerce was required to certify to the
President if another country was acting so as to "diminish the effec-
tiveness" of the Convention. The President was then authorized, but
not required, to impose sanctions on that country.274 Dissatisfied with
the President's failure to impose sanctions, Congress enacted a further
provision under which the Secretary of Commerce was required to ex-
pedite investigation and decision about possible certifications. If the
Secretary certified that another country was acting to "diminish the
effectiveness" of the Convention, the President was required to im-
pose various sanctions.275
In Japan Whaling, Japan had filed timely objections to a harvest
quota of zero for 1981 and 1982. The Secretary of Commerce had not,
as a result of Japan's action, certified to the President that Japan was
diminishing the effectiveness of the Convention. Rather, the Secre-
270. Young v. Community Nutrition Inst., 476 U.S. 974, 986-87 (1986) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
271. Id. at 987, n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
272. 478 U.S. 221 (1986).
273. Id. at 224-25.
274. Id. at 225.
275. Id. at 226.
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tary had entered into negotiations as a result of which Japan agreed to
limit its whaling initially, and to cease all commercial whaling by
1988.276 The Secretary had informed Japan that if it complied with
these agreements, he would not certify Japan to the President so as to
trigger mandatory sanctions. 2 77 Various organizations challenged the
Secretary's failure to act as a violation of the applicable statutory pro-
visions, arguing that any harvest in excess of the Convention limits
diminished the effectiveness of the convention. 278
The Court upheld the Secretary based upon the Secretary's conclu-
sion that the statutes did not require certification in this situation.
While agreeing that the statutes "might reasonably be construed" to
require certification to the President based upon any harvest in excess
of Convention limits, the Court found the statute to be ambiguous and
upheld the Secretary's construction as reasonable.279
As in Young, the Court did not rely upon traditional factors in de-
ferring to the agency. It simply found ambiguity in the statute and
then accepted the agency's view upon determining that it was reason-
able. Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Bren-
nan, Blackmun, and Rehnquist, disagreed that the statutes and their
history were ambiguous on the point at issue, but it did not dispute the
majority's approach to deference given the majority's finding of
ambiguity.280
It is possible that Japan Whaling Association represents a triumph
of the strong, highly deferential reading of Chevron. It seems likely,
however, that two aspects of the case may have influenced the out-
come, although they are not reflected in the opinion. First, as with
Young, the case involved what was essentially a question of
prosecutorial discretion. Moreover, on the facts of the case, the Secre-
tary had quite successfully exercised that discretion to obtain an
agreement that Japan would stop commercial whaling by 1988. Thus,
the fundamental purpose of the statutes had arguably been achieved.
The prosecutorial nature of the Secretary's role and his apparent suc-
cess did not mark the case as one requiring judicial intervention. Sec-
ond, although the Court rejected an argument that the case was
nonjusticiable because it involved foreign affairs,281 the Court was
surely loathe to issue an order that would effectively require the Pres-
ident to impose sanctions upon another country. As Judge Starr has
suggested,28 2 the Court may well be more deferential in cases involv-
276. Id. at 227-28.
277. Id. at 228.
278. Id. at 228-29.
279. Id. at 233.
280. Id. at 241-50 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
281. Id. at 230.
282. See Starr, supra note 2, at 299.
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ing foreign relations.
These two decisions suggest either that the Court may simply fol-
low a strong reading of Chevron in some cases, regardless of the ab-
sence of traditional deference factors, or that it will do so in cases in
which some consideration not articulated in its opinions, such as in-
volvement of foreign relations, leads the Court to leave the matter in
the hands of the administration. Judge Stevens' dissent in Young sug-
gests that he, at least, may refuse to defer if convinced that traditional
factors do not support deference. At best, the law remains unclear,
although it behooves the litigator to couch arguments in terms consis-
tent with a strong reading of Chevron as well as to support arguments
with traditional deference analysis.
3. Determining Statutory Ambiguity-The New Deference
Battleground
The third group of post-Chevron deference decisions demonstrates
that the Court has become deeply split on the question of judicial re-
view of agency statutory interpretations. Indeed, it may well be that
Chevron itself, by clearly articulating the determination of statutory
ambiguity as the initial step in deference analysis, has revealed a clear
ideological split on the scope of judicial review of agency statutes. The
conservative wing of the Court is now seeking to impose new and
more stringent limits on the courts' authority to interpret administra-
tive statutes. The focus of the post-Chevron debate, and even of Chev-
ron itself, was largely on whether the agency, by virtue of its
expertise, was entitled to deference. By contrast, the new conserva-
tive strategy is to limit the authority of the courts to use legislative
history and other tools of statutory construction in determining
whether a statute is ambiguous. The result is likely to be an increase
in findings of statutory ambiguity and, accordingly, an increase in
agency power under step two of the Chevron analysis. The more lib-
eral wing of the Court, on the other hand, appears to be taking an
approach very similar to the traditional interpretation of Hearst.
These developments are consistent with the proposition that political
considerations play a major role in determining deference doctrine.
The curtain rose on this drama in Immigration and Naturalization
Service v. Cardoza-Fonseca,283 which involved an alien's attempt to ob-
tain political asylum under sections 243(h) and 208(a) of the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act.28 4 To obtain asylum under section 243(h),
she was required to show that her life or freedom would be threatened
as a result of her political views if she were returned to Nicaragua.28 5
283. 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
284. Id. at 424.
285. Id.
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Were she to have made such a showing, she would have been entitled
to political asylum.28 6 By contrast, under section 208(a), she was re-
quired to show that she had a "well founded fear of persecution" if she
were sent home. Were she to make the showing required by section
208(a), she would not be entitled to asylum as under section 243(h),
but she would be eligible for asylum at the discretion of the Attorney
General.28 7
The immigration judge, later upheld by the Board of Immigration
Appeals, denied her application for asylum, ruling that she had failed
to show "a clear probability of persecution," and thus was not entitled
to relief under either statutory provision.28 8 The alien appealed the
ruling with respect to the application of section 208(a) on the ground
that the agency had erred in applying to her section 208(a) claim the
"more likely than not" standard of proof applicable to claims under
section 243(h). She argued that a more generous standard applied to
the consideration of asylum as a matter of discretion, as opposed to the
mandatory asylum provisions of section 243(h).289
The Court agreed with the alien.290 Writing for the majority, Jus-
tice Stevens first examined the statutory language. He found that
"the plain language... appears to settle the question before us" and
that "[t]he different emphasis of the two standards is ... clear on the
face of the statute."291 He then turned to the legislative history,
which, he wrote, confirmed his reading of the plain language.292
Relying heavily upon Chevron, the agency argued that its interpre-
tation was entitled to substantial deference. 293 Justice Stevens charac-
terized the agency's argument as "misconstru[ing] the federal courts'
role in reviewing an agency's statutory construction." 294 Justice Ste-
vens' subsequent articulation of his approach to deference, together
with Justice Scalia's response in his concurring opinion, constitute the
first skirmish in what has since become a major battle over judicial
review of agency statutory interpretations.
In an opinion joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun,
and O'Connor, Justice Stevens wrote:
The question whether Congress intended the two standards to be identical
286. Id. at 429.
287. Id. at 427.
288. Id. at 425.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 499.
291. Id. at 432 & n.12.
292. Id. Since the plain language of the statute resolved the matter, Justive Stevens
explained that he turned to the legislative history only to determine whether it
revealed a clear legislative intent contrary to the apparent meaning of the statu-
tory language.
293. Id. at 445 & n.29.
294. Id. at 443.
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is a pure question of statutory construction for the courts to decide. Employ-
ing traditional tools of statutory construction, we have concluded that Con-
gress did not intend the two standards to be identical.
2 9 5
The narrow legal question whether the two standards are the same is, of
course, quite different from the question of interpretation that arises in each
case in which the agency is required to apply either or both standards to a
particular set of facts. There is obviously some ambiguity in a term like "well-
founded fear" which can only be given concrete meaning through a process of
case-by-case adjudication. In that process of filling" 'any gap left, implicitly or
explicitly, by Congress,"' the courts must respect the interpretation of the
agency to which Congress has delegated the responsibility for administering
the statutory program.
2 96
Justice Stevens added in a footnote that the inconsistency of the
agency's positions over the years was an additional reason for denying
deference to the agency's decision. 297
This discussion of deference principles is almost breathtaking in its
rejection of the strong reading of Chevron. These paragraphs, written
by the author of Chevron, constitute the first detailed explanation of
the meaning of the first step of the Chevron analysis. They can be
read in at least three ways, any of which emphasizes the judicial role
in construing agency statutes.
The first, and most simplistic of the three readings, focuses on the
first sentence, which appears to resurrect the "naked question of law"
principle of the Packard decision. This sentence suggests that the first
question is not simply whether Congress has clearly indicated its in-
tent on the matter, as Chevron describes the first step in the analysis,
but whether the nature of the issue is such that it is for the courts, not
the agency to decide. Thus, it may be that Justice Stevens returned to
the ancient law-fact distinction.
The second and more likely reading of this discussion is that Jus-
tice Stevens and four other members of the Court 298 viewed clear
295. Id. at 446 (emphasis added).
296. Id. at 448 (qutting Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467
U.S. 837, 843 (1984) (quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974))).
297. Id. at 446 n.30.
298. Professor Pierce questions whether Justice Blackmun fully accepted this defer-
ence analysis since he filed a concurring opinion in which he emphasized the clar-
ity of the plain language and legislative history. Pierce, supra note 8, at 303 n.15.
Since Justice Blackmun explicitly joined the majority opinion, however, there is
little reason to doubt his agreement with the deference discussion. His accept-
ance of Justice Stevens' approach seems to have been confirmed by his later fail-
ure to join Justice Scalia's concurring opinion in NLRB v. United Food &
Commercial Workers Union, Local 23, 108 S. Ct. 413 (1987), which attacked the
Cardoza-Fonseca deference analysis. This conclusion is clouded somewhat by the
fact that he also, still later, joined Justice Scalia's concurring and dissenting opin-
ion in K-Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 1811 (1988). See infra text accom-
panying notes 347-49. Even more recently, however, Justice Blackmun joined
Justices Brennan and Marshall in dissent in Mississippi Power & Light Co. v.
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questions of law as the province of the courts, while the application of
law to particular facts is initially the province of the agencies since
this is where ambiguity is most likely to arise. This approach reflects
the traditional analysis of Hearst and its progeny.299 It seems inconsis-
tent, however, with the language of Chevron, which states that the
first question is "[w]hether Congress has directly spoken to the precise
question at issue."30 0 The Chevron language suggests that the nature
of the question as one of law or application of law to fact is irrelevant,
and that the courts must defer to the agency whenever the intent of
Congress cannot be clearly determined.01
As discussed earlier, however, when Chevron is read in the context
of preceding deference analysis, the first step as articulated by Justice
Stevens in Chevron is consistent with the distinction between ques-
tions of law and application of law to fact apparent in Cardoza-Fon-
seca. In Chevron, Justice Stevens wrote of whether Congress had
"directly spoken to the precise question at issue."302 The "precise
question" to be considered by the agency may be distinguished from
the questions of law or statutory construction that govern how the
agency is to decide the "precise question." Even under Chevron, the
more general questions of law or statutory construction were for the
courts to decide.
Since this interpretation of Chevron is consistent with preceding
authority and with the facts of Chevron,303 and since Justice Stevens
wrote both Chevron and the majority opinion in Cardoza-Fonseca, this
seems the most likely reading of both decisions. This reading is also
consistent with Justice Stevens' assertion that agency inconsistency di-
Mississippi ex rel Moore, 108 S. Ct. 2428, 2445, 2446-48 (1988), arguing against a
strong reading of Chevron in the context of that case.
It seems clear that Justice O'Connor is no longer comfortable with the defer-
ence discussion in Cardoza-Fonseca. She joined both of Justice Scalia's opinions
in United Food & Commercial Workers and K-Mart. Even this conclusion is
clouded, however, by her adherence to the traditional multifactor approach to
deference in Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors, 468 U.S. 137, 161
(1984) and Gardebring v. Jenkins, 108 S. Ct. 1306, 1317 (1988).
299. See supra text accompanying notes 55-65.
300. Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984).
301. This seeming inconsistency, and the obvious inconsistency between Chevron, and
the first, but least plausible reading of Justice Stevens' opinion, are presumably
what led Professor Pierce, for example, to suggest that "Cardoza-Fonseca may
limit the applicability of Chevron." Pierce, supra note 8, at 303 n.15. As discussed
below, however, Justice Stevens' approach in Cardoza-Fonseca can easily be read
as consistent with Chevron. The alleged inconsistency arises not from unduly
narrow language in Cardoza-Fonseca, but from an unduly broad reading of
Chevron.
302. Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984).
303. See supra text accompanying notes 187-99.
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minishes any entitlement to deference. 304 This explicit reference to
one of the prominent considerations in traditional multifactor analysis
further suggests that Justice Stevens did not view Cievron as a depar-
ture from previous doctrine.
Finally, this reading also provides the context for Justice Stevens'
explanation in Cardoza-Fonseca that he had employed "traditional
tools of statutory construction" to determine congressional intent.3 05
Having identified the issue in the case as one of law or statutory con-
struction, rather than application of law to fact, Justice Stevens natu-
rally turned to the available tools of statutory construction to resolve
the issue that the Court was responsible for deciding.
This reference to employing the traditional tools of statutory con-
struction suggests a third possible reading of the opinion. It could be
that Justice Stevens was simply emphasizing that the use of legislative
history and similar traditional tools is essential to the Court's effort to
determine congressional intent under the first step in the Chevron
analysis. While this reading is inconsistent with other language in Jus-
tice Stevens' discussion of deference, it is plausible in light of his con-
servative colleagues' increasing attempts to denigrate the role of
legislative history in review of agency statutory interpretations. 0 6
Whichever of these readings may be a correct understanding of
what Justice Stevens intended, all of them maintain a major role for
the judiciary in interpreting agency statutes. While they may go so far
as to reserve pure issues of law for the courts to decide, at a minimum
they would authorize the courts to consider legislative history and
similar "traditional tools of statutory construction" in determining
whether Congress has clearly expressed its intent on the point at
issue.
Concurring in the judgment in Cardoza-Fonseca, Justice Scalia
fired the opening shots in the current battle over the scope of judicial
authority to determine the meaning of statutes administered by fed-
eral agencies. 307 First, he criticized the majority for even discussing
the question of deference when the clarity of the statutory language
304. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 466 n.30
(1987). See supra note 297.
305. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 (1987).
306. See infra text accompanying notes 308-12, 331-34, 351-54.
307. Professor Pierce describes the three dissenting Justices in Cardoza-Fonseca as
"obviously reject[ing] the majority's position," implying that they disagreed with
Justice Stevens' discussion of deference. Pierce, supra note 8, at 303 n.15. This
implication is incorrect. The dissent disagreed about the interpretation of the
statute. It did not take a position on the propriety of Justice Stevens' approach to
deference. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,
450-69 (1987). Since Justice Powell left the Court before the deference debate
was resumed, we cannot determine his view of the matter. Justices Rehnquist
and White, who joined the dissent, have since clearly sided with Justice Scalia.
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rendered any such discussion unnecessary.30s Second, he argued that
Justice Stevens' articulation of deference doctrine was contrary to
Chevron's admonition that "a court may not substitute its own con-
struction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made
by the administrator of an agency." 309 Justice Scalia argued, in partic-
ular, that the majority was incorrect in asserting that a court may
reach its own judgment about the meaning of a statute based upon
"traditional tools of statutory construction." 310 Allowing the courts to
rely upon the traditional tools of statutory construction would, he said,
"make deference a doctrine of desperation, authorizing courts to defer
only if they would otherwise be unable to construe the enactment at
issue." He considered this result to be "an evisceration of Chevron."311
Finally, Justice Scalia rejected the majority's apparent approval of the
distinction between questions of law and questions involving the appli-
cation of law to particular facts. He asserted that this position was
contradicted by Chevron itself, in which the Court had deferred to the
EPA's "abstract interpretation of the phrase 'stationary source.' "312
The battle was fully joined in NLRB v. United Food & Commercial
Workers Union, Local 23,313 in which a union challenged the decision
of an NLRB Regional Administrator to accept an informal settlement
of a complaint that had originally been issued at the instigation of the
union. An NLRB regulation authorized the Regional Director to
enter into either a formal or an informal settlement after the filing of
an unfair labor practice complaint. The regulations further allowed a
nonconsenting party to appeal a formal settlement to the General
Counsel and then to the Board itself. Any decision of the Board would
then be judicially reviewable. By contrast, the regulations allowed a
nonconsenting party to appeal an informal settlement only to the Gen-
eral Counsel, whose decision was then final and unreviewable. The
union challenged the regulation, arguing that all settlements reached
after the filing of a complaint must be approved by the Board.314
Writing for an eight-member Court after the resignation of Justice
Powell, Justice Brennan upheld the NLRB regulation and sustained
the agency's position that the informal settlement was unreviewable.
In so doing, he relied heavily upon the principles of statutory interpre-
tation discussed by Justice Stevens in Cardoza-Fonseca. First, he
wrote, "[o]n a pure question of statutory construction," the Court must
308. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452 (1987)
(Scalia, J., concurring).
309. Id. at 454 (citing Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S.
837, 844 (1984)).
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id. at 455.
313. 108 S. Ct. 413 (1987).
314. Id. at 417.
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seek to determine the intent of Congress, "using 'traditional tools of
statutory construction.'" If the Court can determine congressional in-
tent, then "that interpretation must be given effect." Second, if the
statute is "silent or ambiguous," then the question becomes whether
the agency's construction is permissible.315 Third, in reviewing the
agency's construction, the Court will consider "the consistency with
which [it] has been applied, and whether [it] was contemporaneous
with the enactment of the statute being construed."316
Applying these principles, the Court first found that Congress had
clearly intended to differentiate between decisions that are
prosecutorial in nature, which are the province of the General Coun-
sel, and those that have reached the stage of adjudication, which are
within the authority of the Board.3 ' 7 Having thus determined the
binding congressional intent, the Court then left it to the agency to
determine precisely where, between the two extremes, particular
cases might fall. The Court ultimately upheld the agency's determina-
tion that a decision to settle prior to hearing was prosecutorial in na-
ture. The Court found this to be a reasonable application of the
statute.3S 8
Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Rehnquist, White, and O'Connor,
joined and concurred in the Court's opinion. The sole purpose of his
concurrence, he said, was to assert that the Court's opinion "demon-
strates the continuing and unchanged vitality of" his reading of Chev-
ron. He argued that if the Court had applied Cardoza-Fonseca, the
question at hand would have been "'a pure question of statutory con-
struction' rather than the application of a 'standard... to a particular
set of facts,' as to which 'the courts must respect the interpretation of
the agency."' Thus, he asserted, the Court would have decided the
issue "conclusively and authoritatively, rather than merely 'decid[ing]
whether the agency's regulatory placement is permissible.' "319
Justice Scalia's innocent assertion that he agreed with the Court's
analysis and was simply noting the Court's consistency with Chevron
is disingenuous at best. To the contrary, he was seeking to establish
an interpretation of United Food & Commercial Workers that would
be consistent with his own views as expressed in Cardoza-Fonseca, and
that would be inconsistent with the Court's opinions in both cases.
Moreover, his concurring opinions inaccurately characterize the Chev-
ron decision and distort what the Court did in United Food and Com-
mercial Workers.
Justice Scalia, joined by the rest of the Court's conservative
315. Id. at 421.
316. Id. at 421 n.20.
317. Id. at 421-22.
318. Id. at 422.
319. Id. at 426 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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wing,320 differed from the other members of the Court 32' on at least
two crucial issues. First, relying on Chevron, he rejected the distinc-
tion between questions of law and questions of application of law to
particular facts. Second, also relying on Chevron, he rejected the use
of legislative history and other traditional tools of statutory construc-
tion in determining the meaning of statutes.
His rejection of the law-application of law distinction was premised
on the proposition that the Court in Chevron had deferred to the
EPA's interpretation of the term "statutory source" rather than to a
more concrete application of law to fact. He sought to buttress his
argument by asserting that the Court would not have decided United
Food & Commercial Workers as it did if it had applied the law-applica-
tion of law analysis.
His analysis of both decisions is unduly simplistic. The Court in
Chevron did not simply defer to an abstract interpretation by the
agency.322 Rather, noting that the issue at hand involved only one
phrase in a small portion of "lengthy, detailed, technical, complex, and
comprehensive" amendments to the Clean Air Act,323 the Court em-
phasized that the statutory language appeared to reveal an intent "to
enlarge, rather than to confine, the scope of the Agency's power to
regulate particular sources in order to effectuate the policies of the
Act."324 The Court also relied upon the fact that Congress had left it
to the agency to resolve conflicting congressional policy interests "on
the level of specificity" at issue in the particular cases. 325 Finally, the
Court relied upon the EPA's superior expertise in determining that
the particular "bubble concept" application of the statute would, as a
matter of fact, serve both economic and environmental concerns.326
To characterize the Court's approach in Chevron as an "abstract
interpretation" is, in Justice Scalia's words, "an evisceration" of the
term "abstract interpretation." The difference between Hearst and
Chevron, for example, is not that the former involved the application
of law to particular facts, while the latter did not. Rather, the differ-
320. As noted above, he was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and
O'Connor in his concurrence in United Food & Commercial Workers. After the
resignation of Justice Powell, and before the confirmation of Justice Kennedy,
these three Justices and Justice Scalia constituted the conservative wing of the
Court. N.Y. Times, Aug. 13, 1987, at 131, col. 2.
321. The members of the Court who have not adopted Justice Scalia's approach to
deference are Justice Stevens, the author of Chevron and Cardoza-Fonseca, Jus-
tice Brennan, the author of United Food & Commercial Workers, Justice Mar-
shall, and Justice Blackmun. Justice Kennedy had not yet joined the Court for
any of the decisions discussed thus far.
322. See supra text accompanying notes 150-81, 186-98.
323. Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 848 (1984).
324. Id. at 862.
325. Id. at 865.
326. Id. at 863 n.37. See supra text accompanying notes 176-78, 196.
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ence is that Hearst involved the application of law to fact in the con-
text of an individual adjudication, while Chevron involved application
of law to fact in the context of a rulemaking proceeding. The EPA's
expertise and its application of the conflicting statutory interests to
the facts concerning market behavior and environmental effect appear
to have been central to the outcome of Chevron.327 Thus, Cevron is
an example of judicial review of an agency's application of law to par-
ticular facts.
If Justice Scalia misinterpreted Chevron with respect to the law-
application of law distinction, he simply ignored the Court's adoption
of the pre-Chevron deference analysis in United Food and Commer-
cial Workers. As in Hearst, the Court's opinion resolved the "pure
question of statutory construction" by ruling that Congress had in-
tended to differentiate between prosecutorial and adjudicatory deci-
sions for the purpose of judicial review.328 Having established the
boundaries of the agency's discretion, the Court, in traditional fashion,
deferred to the agency's exercise of that discretion in applying the
principles to the particular facts, in this case the fact that the hearing
had not yet begun. As in Chevron, the only difference from Hearst
was that the agency had applied the law to facts in a rulemaking pro-
ceeding, rather than in an individual case. Thus, Justice Scalia's asser-
tion that the Court would have reached a binding, rather than a
deferential conclusion under the law-application of law distinction is
incorrect. The Court's decision was binding with respect to the princi-
ples bounding agency discretion, but deferential with respect to the
exercise of the discretion in the particular case. Moreover, Justice
Scalia's discussion ignores the Court's explicit reference to consistency
and contemporaneous construction as factors to consider in deference
analysis. 32 9 That reference refutes Justice Scalia's assertion that
deference depends solely upon whether the statute is "silent or
ambiguous." 33 0
The second deference issue on which Justice Scalia and his con-
servative colleagues part company with the rest of the Court involves
the extent to which the Court may rely upon traditional tools of statu-
tory construction in seeking to determine congressional intent under
the first step of the Chevron analysis. In Cardoza-Fonseca, Justice
Scalia asserted that the Court had mistakenly implied that a court
could substitute its judgment for that of the "agency whenever,
'[e]mploying traditional tools of statutory construction,' [it is] able to
reach a conclusion as to the proper interpretation of the statute." He
327. See supra text accompanying notes 177-79, 195.
328. NLRB v. United Food & Commerical Workers Union, Local 23, 108 S. Ct. 413, 421
(1987).
329. Id. at 421 n.20.
330. Id. at 426.
[Vol. 68:454
DEFERENCE REVISITED
argued that this would allow "courts to defer only if they would other-
wise be unable to construe the enactment at issue." This, he said,
would constitute "an evisceration of Chevron."331
Unfortunately, it is not entirely clear what Justice Scalia was at-
tacking. It may be that he was asserting that legislative history and
traditional tools of statutory construction have no place at all in deter-
mining, under the first step of the Chevron analysis, whether Con-
gress has expressed a clear intent. If so, his position is inconsistent
with Chevron's specific approval of the use of traditional tools of statu-
tory construction. 332 This is such a departure from long-accepted
jurisprudential principles that it seems unlikely.
Perhaps, on the other hand, Justice Scalia is not complaining about
the use of traditional tools of statutory construction per se, but, to use
Professor Pierce's terminology, about their use to "tease" meaning
from an ambiguous statute in order to achieve a particular result.3 33 If
so, his complaint is inconsistent with what the Court actually did in
Cardoza-Fonseca. The Court did not seek to determine what the
proper interpretation would be in the case at hand. Rather, it left that
question to the agency after identifying the clear congressional
intent.3 34
There is no doubt, however, that Cardoza-Fonseca's adoption of the
distinction between pure questions of statutory interpretation and
questions of application of the statute to particular facts represents a
far less deferential position than that urged by Justice Scalia and con-
servative commentators. It maintains the Court's traditional role of
determining the boundaries of agency discretion, which is essential to
the separation of powers. Hardly an evisceration of Chevron, it is con-
sistent with a correct reading of that decision and with longstanding
deference doctrine.
Two additional decisions reveal what may be the source of the con-
servative attempt to revise deference doctrine and limit the Court's
role in statutory construction.335 K-Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.33 6 is the
331. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 454 (1987)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
332. Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9
(1984).
333. Pierce, supra note 8, at 308.
334. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 (1987).
335. One other decision further reveals the split between the conservative and liberal
wings of the Court, although it sheds little light on reasons for the split. In Mis-
sissippi Power & Light Co. v. Mississipppi ex reL Moore, 108 S. Ct. 2428, 2443,
2446-48 (1988), Justices Scalia and Brennan clashed in concurring and dissenting
opinions, respectively, over whether to grant deference to an agency's determina-
tion of the scope of its own jurisdiction. Justice Scalia argued for a strong reading
and application of Chevron, while Justice Brennan argued for a more traditional,
less deferential analysis.
336. 108 S. Ct. 1811 (1988).
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first deference decision in which Justice Kennedy participated. It is a
horrendously complex decision, composed of three opinions with shift-
ing majorities depending upon which Justices joined which parts of
the opinions. It involved review of Customs Service regulations gov-
erning so-called "gray-market" goods. These are goods that are manu-
factured in a foreign country, bear a valid United States trademark,
and are imported into the United States without the consent of the
United States trademark holder.3 37 The governing statute prohibited
the importation, without the consent of the United States trademark
holder, of "any merchandise of foreign manufacture" bearing a trade-
mark "owned by" a citizen of, or by "a corporation ... organized
within, the United States," whose trademark is "registered... by a
person domiciled in the United States."338
The Customs Service regulations authorized import of foreign-
manufactured goods by the same person who holds the United States
trademark or by a person who is subject to control in common with
the United States trademark holder, such as a parent or subsidiary of
the United States trademark holder. This is referred to as the com-
mon-control exception. The Customs Service regulations also author-
ized entry of foreign-manufactured goods where the foreign
manufacturer had received the United States trademark owner's per-
mission to use the trademark. This is the authorized-use exception.
The Court ultimately upheld the common-control exception, but
struck down the authorized use exception as contrary to the statute. 39
Deference analysis, applied in various ways in the three opinions,
hinged on whether the statutory terms "foreign manufacture" and
"owner"340 were ambiguous such that the Court should defer to the
agency's interpretation. Justice Kennedy asserted, for example, that
"foreign manufacture" could mean manufactured in a foreign country,
by a foreign company, or in a foreign country by a foreign company,"
and that "owned by" could mean owned by a foreign parent of a do-
mestic company or owned only by a domestic subsidiary of a foreign
parent.341
Two aspects of this decision are important to this discussion. First,
Justice Brennan and Justice Scalia disagreed vehemently about the
proper judicial role in construing the statute. Second, Justice Ken-
nedy's opinion, joined by Justice White, suggests that legislative his-
tory should be considered virtually irrelevant in deference analysis.
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and Stevens, wrote
that "[e]ven if the language of [the statute] clearly covered [a particu-
337. Id. at 1814.
338. Id.
339. Id. at 1816 n.2.
340. Id. at 1815.
341. Id. at 1818.
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lar situation], '[it is a "familiar rule, that a thing may be within the
letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not within
its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers.' "342 Accordingly, cit-
ing Cardoza-Fonseca, he turned to "traditional tools of statutory con-
struction" to determine congressional intent.343 With respect to the
"common-control exception," he found ambiguity in the statutory lan-
guage, reviewed the legislative history, and ultimately deferred to the
agency on the ground that the exception was reasonable in light of the
legislative history and the longstanding nature of the agency's posi-
tion.344 This aspect of Justice Brennan's opinion, together with the
portion of Justice Kennedy's opinion joined by Justice White, made up
the majority position on this issue.
Turning to the "authorized-use exception," Justice Brennan,
joined now by Justice White in addition to Justices Marshall and Ste-
vens, argued, in essence, that the statute could not have contemplated
the authorized-use situation because at the time the statute was en-
acted it was generally not possible for a trademark owner to license
the use of its trademark by another firm without losing ownership of
the trademark.3 45 Thus, while "the casual reader" might believe that
a domestic firm that had authorized use of its trademark still "owned"
the trademark, Congress could not have contemplated this result.346
Further, he argued, this result is inconsistent with the purpose of the
statute. Accordingly, the statute was ambiguous with respect to this
situation, and the Court should defer to the agency's longstanding
position.3 4 7
Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Rehnquist, Blackmun, and
O'Connor, dissented with respect to the majority position upholding
the "common-control exception." On this issue, they argued that the
statute was not ambiguous, and that the majority had purported to
defer to "a view of the statute that the agency clearly rejects."' 4s This
aspect of the dispute within the Court has little significance beyond
the particular decision. These Justices simply found clarity where the
342. Id. at 1821-22 (citations omitted).
343. Id.
344. Id. at 1828. In discussing the "common-control exception," he delved at great
length into the legislative history and concluded that "if Congress had any partic-
ular intent with respect to the application of" the statute to the common-control
situation, it was to exclude domestic trademark owners affiliated with foreign
manufacturers from the protection of the Act. Accordingly, he argued, the Cus-
toms Service's common-control exception was reasonable and should be sus-
tained. Id. at 1826. He further buttressed this position by arguing that the Court
does "not lightly overturn administrative practices as longstanding" as these,
which dated back fifty years. Id. at 1828.
345. Id. at 1828-30.
346. Id.
347. Id. at 1830-31.
348. Id. at 1832-33.
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others found ambiguity. It is interesting to note, however, that Justice
Scalia emphasized "one of the most important reasons we defer to an
agency's construction of a statute: its expert knowledge of the inter-
pretation's practical consequences." 349 This suggests that a litigant
might be able to sway some of these Justices away from deference by
showing that an agency has no expertise on the point, or that its ex-
pertise is irrelevant to the issue at hand.
The heart of Justice Scalia's opinion is an attack upon what he
viewed as Justice Brennan's willingness "to decline to apply a statute
to a situation that its language concededly covers."350 He argued, in
essence, that where statutory language is clear, it must govern any at-
tempt to discern and apply congressional intent, and that it is the pre-
rogative of Congress, not the courts, to change the laws. He viewed
Justice Brennan's approach to statutory construction as an affront to
"[t]he principle of our Democratic system."351
This debate between a leading liberal member of the Court and one
if its most conservative members highlights the political nature of the
struggle over deference doctrine. The debate is not limited to matters
involving deference, or even to statutes involving administrative agen-
cies. Both arguments apply to any judicial consideration of a legisla-
tive enactment. They relate to deference only because a determination
of statutory ambiguity would generally lead to deference in the admin-
istrative arena. Accordingly, this is a fundamental d~bate about the
role of the judiciary.
Turning to the narrower field of deference doctrine itself, it is rea-
sonable to conclude that Justice Scalia and his conservative colleagues
view Justice Brennan and the liberal members of the Court as playing
fast and loose with the first step of the Chevron analysis, determina-
tion of whether the statute is ambiguous. While it seems unlikely that
any member of the Court had a political agenda with respect to the
particulars of K-Mart, Justice Brennan's opinion with respect to the
authorized-use exception could be read as an attempt to allow the
agency to maintain the viability of a regulatory program despite seem-
ingly rigid statutory language. Seen in that light, Justice Brennan's
approach to statutory construction could play a major role in main-
taining the administrative state by allowing courts to sustain agency
actions that are consistent with the apparent purpose of Congress even
if they may seem inconsistent with statutory language. This arguably
serves not only to strengthen the hand of administrative agencies, but
also to protect the interests of Congress by assuring that the apparent
congressional purpose will be followed even if Congress was imprecise
349. Id. at 1833.
350. Id. at 1834.
351. Id.
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in its choice of language or had not adequately anticipated changes
that would alter the effect of the statutory language.
By contrast, refusal to consider legislative history in determining
statutory ambiguity, as advocated by Justice Scalia, tends to reduce
judicial flexibility in construing statutes. Since Congress could no
longer rely upon the Court to require agencies to adhere to the pur-
pose of congressional enactments, it would be burdened by the need to
be more precise in its use of language and in its decisionmaking about
all aspects of a proposed regulatory program. Since, as Judge Mikva
explained, 5 2 this is probably an unrealistic expectation, the result
could well be to hamper the achievement of congressional purposes
and to slow the development of the administrative state. Ironically,
the attempt to move toward heightened deference to administrative
agencies through a strong reading of Chevron could result ultimately
in the decline of the administrative state. This could be the funda-
mental reason why conservative interests are pressing for an approach
to deference that otherwise seems contrary to their abhorrence of gov-
ernmental power.
Justice Kennedy's opinion in K-Mart, joined by Justice White, and
Justice White's concurrence in the otherwise unexceptional Regents of
the University of California v. Public Employment Relations
Board,353 are consistent with this proposition. In K-Mart, Justice Ken-
nedy argued that in determining whether a statute is "arguably ambig-
uous,... any reference to legislative history... is in the first instance
irrelevant."354 Similarly, in Regents, Justice White wrote that
"[w]here the statute itself is not determinative and is open to more
than one construction, the legislative history must be quite clear if it is
to foreclose the agency's construction."355 Thus, Justices Kennedy
and White both seem to go beyond even Justice Scalia in restricting
the judiciary's ability to determine statutory meaning. They more
clearly reject the use of legislative history as an aid in determining
whether Congress had a clear intent where the statutory language it-
self is arguably ambiguous.356 The result of this approach is likely to
352. Mikva, Reply, supra note 205, at 380-82 & n.212.
353. 108 S. Ct. 1404 (1988). This case involved the question of whether a state univer-
sity's refusal to carry unstamped letters in its internal mail for union members
constituted an unfair labor practice under California law. It hinged on the inter-
pretation of federal statutes governing the mails, which the university argued
prohibited it from competing with the Postal Service. The majority, relying upon
both statutory language and legislative history, concluded that Congress' clear
intent was ascertainable and did not consider the matter of deference.
354. K-Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 1811, 1818 n.4 (1988).
355. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Public Employment Relations Bd., 108 S. Ct. 1404,
1413 (1988) (White, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
356. It is noteworthy that this position has been argued by Judge Starr, a conservative
Reagan appointee to the D.C. Circuit. Starr, Observations About the Use of Legis-
lative History, 1987 DUKE L.J. 371, 375-79. This further suggests that the goal of
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be a greater tendency to find ambiguity in statutes, which would, in
turn, increase agency discretion in implementing statutes.
This position would further hamstring Congress by denying it the
right to use the traditional tools of the legislative process to achieve its
ends. While there is no doubt that statutory language is the most im-
portant determinant of congressional intent, it is also true that Con-
gress expresses its intent in other ways, particularly with respect to
matters that may not be specifically addressed in the statute itself.
Those other ways include committee reports, floor debates, and all of
the variety of actions and discussions that make up legislative his-
tory.3 57 The conservative approach would render all of these tools
useless in congressional efforts to direct agencies and to avoid exces-
sive agency discretion. To deprive Congress of the right to rely upon
these mechanisms, which it has chosen to develop and use over the
last 200 years, would be a serious judicial infringement upon the pre-
rogatives of another branch of government.
IV. CONCLUSION
At this point, deference doctrine and the matter of judicial review
of agency statutory interpretations are highly unsettled. It is clear
that if the Court believes that Congress has clearly expressed its in-
tent with respect to a particular matter, that intent is binding. The
difficulty here is that there are at least two, and perhaps three, views
on the Court about what a court may consider and how far it may go in
attempting to discern congressional intent. At one end, the more lib-
eral members of the Court will employ the full range of traditional
tools of statutory construction to divine intent, while at the other, Jus-
tices Kennedy and White seem to reject all but the clearest indications
of intent appearing anywhere other than the language of the statute.
It is not clear where Justice Scalia and the other conservatives draw
the line, but there is no doubt that they will demand great specificity
restricting judicial authority to interpret statutes is consistent with a conservative
political agenda. In addition to the goal discussed earlier, that of strengthening
the hand of a conservative administration, the agenda may also include the ham-
pering of the administrative state.
357. It may be argued that the very concept of legislative intent outside the language
of a statute is a myth because it is not possible to determine the intent of all 535
members of Congress and because much of what later becomes legislative intent
is gamesmanship among the members interested in the particular legislation.
This argument misconceives the concept of congressional intent. The point is not
that the members of Congress think in a particular way, but that there are vari-
ous mechanisms for influencing the outcome of legislative battles. It is accepted
in Congress that, in addition to formal amendments, committee reports and con-
trived dialogues among interested members are legitimate mechanisms for affect-
ing the interpretation and application of statutes. Mikva, Reply, supra note 205,
at 380-82 & n.212.
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in legislative history before finding clarity outside the language of the
statute.
Whatever approach is used to determine statutory meaning, if the
statute is found to be ambiguous on a particular point it appears that
the Court is split on the next step. Justices Stevens, Brennan, Mar-
shall, and Blackmun 35 8 would apparently have the courts decide all
pure questions of law, leaving application of law to the agency. The
other Justices, however, would then defer to the agency's interpreta-
tion if it were reasonable. Moreover, it appears that the conservative
wing generally rejects, or at least does not require consideration of,
traditional deference factors, while the other Justices will be swayed
by such things as whether or not an agency took its position contempo-
raneously with enactment of the statute, whether its position has been
longstanding and consistent, and whether the agency's expertise has a
bearing on the construction of the statute in the particular case.
It is difficult, therefore, to suggest any guidance either to litigants
or to lower courts. If, as Professor Strauss has argued, Chevron was
intended as a management tool to improve consistency in applying the
laws and to enhance control over the lower courts,359 that tool is in
serious disrepair. It has been torn asunder by the Court's ideological
division, which has the conservative Justices seeking to expand Chev-
ron far beyond its original bounds, while the other members of the
Court adhere to a more traditional approach to judicial review of
agency statutory interpretations.
Perhaps more important, this review suggests that deference doc-
trine depends in large part upon the politics of the various judges and
the relationship between their politics and those of the administra-
tions whose decisions they are reviewing. Accordingly, as commenta-
tors and jurists seek to recover from the post-Chevron disintegration
of deference doctrine, they must attempt to develop objective criteria
that either eliminate political considerations from deference decisions,
or, if need be, that acknowledge and highlight the role of political con-
siderations so they can be understood and controlled.
358. While Justice Blackmun joined Justice Scalia's opinion in K-Mart Corp. v.
Cartier, 108 S. Ct. 1811, 1830 (1988), his adherence to Justice Scalia's view of how
a statute should be interpreted does not contradict his joining Justice Stevens in
Cardoza-Fonseca and Justice Brennan in United Food & Commercial Workers on
the proposition that pure questions of statutory construction are for the courts to
decide.
359. Strauss, supra note 184, at 1093 n.19.
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